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The	  key	  question	  discussed	  in	  this	  dissertation	  concerns	  the	  future	  path	  that	  the	  
European	  Union	  could	  take.	  Conceptual	  framework	  developed	  to	  answer	  this	  
question	  derives	  from	  theories	  and	  concepts	  explaining	  the	  rise	  and	  decline	  of	  
empires	  and	  the	  emergence	  and	  survival	  of	  regimes	  understood	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  
hegemonic	  stability	  theory.	  This	  project	  involves	  a	  review	  of	  empire	  and	  regime	  
formation	  theory	  as	  possible	  ways	  of	  examining	  the	  evolutionary	  path	  of	  the	  
European	  Union.	  The	  European	  Union	  is	  compared	  to	  the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	  to	  
analyze	  its	  similarities	  to	  an	  empire.	  Among	  others,	  this	  involves	  a	  review	  of	  
European	  enlargement	  and	  the	  region’s	  political	  institution	  building	  as	  a	  
characteristic	  of	  empires.	  By	  analyzing	  major	  forces	  driving	  the	  European	  
integration	  in	  terms	  of	  both	  concepts,	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  the	  European	  Union	  is	  a	  
hybrid	  regime	  with	  characteristics	  of	  an	  empire.	  I	  conclude	  that	  its	  survival	  depends	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 The European Union (EU) is a fascinating integration project that is also unique 
in the world. There is no other example like it. There is no history for scholars, 
politicians, and citizens to study that directly relates to the EU to try to determine what 
path it will take in the future. In order to answer the question where the EU is headed, I 
look at two different theories to try and understand the dynamics behind the European 
Union. One theory, empires, has been written about by many scholars, and has been 
linked to the European Union through the Holy Roman Empire. The second theory, 
regime formation theory, has not been as studied, but is highly applicable to the EU. 
Other theories that are used to study the EU are intergovernmentalism and 
supranationalism, but they are not discussed here. Many of their main tenants are similar 
to or are included in regime formation theory (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). 
I then attempt to combine the two conceptual tools to understand the dynamics 
behind the forces of the evolution of the European Union. The evolution of integration is 
examined, from its beginnings in economic integration to growing political and economic 
integration that resulted in the institutionalization of new practices for the member 
countries, which are also forces of change and evolution. Modern integration began with 
the European Coal and Steel Community. This initial economic integration was necessary 
in order to have peace in Europe after two devastating world wars. Integration was 
expanded with the Treaties of Rome, during which time international events were 
occurring that made Europeans realize that they needed to act together to have a voice in 
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international affairs. However, the decision-making institutions were not efficient, and 
the economy was stagnant. It was not until 1985, with the Single European Act (SEA), 
that integration was reignited. The introduction of qualified majority voting (QMV) 
allowed member states to move forward without a unanimous decision. In 2007, the 
Treaty of Lisbon brought the member states even closer and introduced more democratic 
measures (Delors 2013). 
In the end, I conclude that the future of the European Union is impossible to 
predict. The EU cannot be understood solely in terms of an empire. Regime formation 
theory is a better framework for understanding the evolution of the EU, which is affected 
by different state backgrounds and priorities. The future of this unique integration project 
will depend on how external factors affect internal ones.
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Chapter	  1:	  Conceptualization:	  Empire	  vs.	  Regime	  Formation	  
	  
Growing scholarly literature seeks to understand the European Union and 
determine where it is headed. Some focus on current issues, such as the Euro crisis, to say 
that the EU will decline. Others take a broader look by addressing the question of the 
classification of the EU by looking at in terms of empire analysis: the process of 
emergence and future evolution is seen as a characteristic of an empire. I use Jan 
Zielonka’s Europe as Empire: The Nature of the Enlarged European Union, Alejandro 
Colás’ Empire, Michael Doyle’s Empires, Robert Folz’s The Concept of Empire in 
Western Europe from the Fifth to the Fourteenth Century, and James Muldoon’s Empire 
and Order: The Concept of Empire, 800-1800 as my main sources of literature. An 
unexplored tool that could be used to understand and predict the future of the European 
Union is the theory of regime formation. I utilize Robert Keohane’s After Hegemony: 
Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy and Walter Mattli’s The Logic 
of Regional Integration: Europe and Beyond as the basis for my regime formation theory 
framework. 
In this chapter I will review the literature about empires and regime formation 
theory. The European Union is often compared to or characterized as an empire. My 
analysis of empires will help determine if this is an accurate comparison. Regime 
formation theory can be applied to the European Union from a different angle, one that is 
only just beginning to be researched. I will begin with empires: how they form, their 
main characteristics, and how they fall. I will then examine the important features of the 
Holy Roman Empire, the role of religion as a unifying factor, and the importance of 
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Rome’s legacy as the center of the original Roman Empire to later compare the European 
Union to the Holy Roman Empire. In the final section, I review regime formation theory. 
I begin with an overview of Robert Keohane’s theory, but add in Walter Mattli’s theory 
to make it more applicable to the European Union. I also look at additional factors for the 
continuation of a regime and the conditions for fragmentation.  
Empire	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  analysis	  
	  
Empires have existed since the earliest recorded history, but the way we 
understand the terms “empire” and “emperor” has evolved since then. James Muldoon 
(1999) traces the evolution of empire and emperor from the Middle Ages to the early 
modern world. His discussion begins with the imperial coronation of Charlemagne in 800 
by Pope Leo II. Charlemagne’s coronation was a highly politicized event. However, the 
meaning of the event was ambiguous. It was difficult to tell who was more important: the 
new emperor Charlemagne or the Pope. It was also unclear what the crowning of the new 
emperor meant for the emperor of the eastern empire. It could mean that the Church was 
recognizing Charlemagne’s importance and the success of his territorial expansion, or 
that it was symbolic of him becoming the protector of the papacy against its enemies 
(Muldoon 1999).1  
In the eleventh and twelfth centuries, a revival of Roman law brought back the 
notion that the emperor is the lord of the world. This was in direct contrast to the 
Church’s conception of empire, that the emperor was the pope’s agent. Under German 
leadership, the empire became known as the Sacred or Christian Roman Empire, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  The	  pope,	  through	  the	  Church,	  played	  a	  much	  larger	  role	  in	  medieval	  governments.	  Charlemagne’s	  coronation	  
could	  have	  signified	  a	  transfer	  of	  the	  empire	  from	  east	  to	  west.	  One	  theory,	  at	  the	  time,	  defined	  the	  empire	  as	  
“…an	  office	  within	  the	  Church	  with	  the	  emperor	  acting	  at	  the	  behest	  of	  the	  pope	  (Muldoon	  15).”	  In	  this	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then, in the fifteenth century, as the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, which 
limited the concept of empire to territories ruled by the German emperor (Muldoon 
1999). 
The term imperium was used by the Romans to mean rule over the kingdoms that 
they had conquered. Medieval writers also extended the term to other medieval rulers as 
praise because the kings had “conquered neighboring lands and brought them under their 
imperium (Muldoon 1999, 16).” Imperium then evolved to mean something similar to our 
modern conception of sovereignty in a decretal by Pope Innocent III.2 A king was 
considered to have the highest authority within his kingdom, like the kind of power an 
emperor possessed over his empire. This concept was then extended to include exemption 
from papal authority, a model made famous by King Henry VIII of England. Dante also 
held this view. He believed that “a universal Christian empire was the logical and 
necessary goal of humanity (Muldoon 1999, 16-7). The emperor, not the pope, was the 
center of the empire (Muldoon 1999). 
Among spiritual circles and theologians, “empire” referred to “the series of four 
powerful empires that the Prophet Daniel described as agents of God’s providential plan 
for mankind. It was possible to identify an emperor as the last in the line of world rulers 
whose reign would mark the beginning of the end of human history (Muldoon 1999, 17).” 
Empire and emperor could also have a moral implication. They could refer to a 
“tyrannical and corrupt form of government that destroyed the ancient Roman republican 
tradition (Muldoon 1999, 17).” 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  The	  decretal	  of	  Pope	  Innocent	  III	  was	  an	  explanation	  of	  why	  he	  would	  not	  intervene	  in	  France.	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Imperium and imperator had different connotations in the Middle Ages than in the 
ancient Roman world. In ancient Rome, imperium meant “power” or the legal power to 
enforce the law, rather than sovereignty. The term had no territorial connotation; instead 
it meant that authority figures had the power of life and death over the citizens of Rome. 
Imperator was somewhat associated with territoriality; it was given to generals who had 
won a significant victory. During Augustus’ reign, imperium was understood as the 
power exercised over other peoples and was used to describe conquered lands now under 
Rome’s jurisdiction, leading to further integration between peoples. This effectively 
bridged the ancient and modern views of the term imperium (Muldoon 1999). 
Empires have frequently emerged from successful republics. Perhaps the most 
famous example is the Roman Empire. The empire was initially successful because its 
roots were in inclusive economic and political institutions. This allowed the Roman 
Republic to flourish, and the Roman Empire was able to live off that legacy of wealth for 
many years to come. As economic and political institutions become more extractive, the 
Roman Empire began a slow decline. Extractive institutions eventually led to the decline 
of the empire by causing infighting and civil war. Venice is also an example of a once 
vibrant city with a thriving economy that has become nothing more than a museum for 
tourists due to a movement from inclusiveness to extraction. Previously, anyone could 
make a fortune. As more people became rich, more people could participate in 
government, which threatened the elites, as this decreased their influence. This led the 
elites to start freezing out newcomers and making it more difficult to become successful 
economically (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). 
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Empires are distinctive from nation-states because they do not have fixed borders 
and are characterized by constant expansion (Colás 2007). They have three important 
dimensions: expansion, hierarchy, and order. Applied to today, expansion is “…a policy 
and a process, guided in large measure by an ideologically constructed sense of 
superiority, which seeks to assimilate foreign regions and populations into an expanding 
polity…this incorporation need not be territorial or juridical; it is possible for a given 
state to be imperialist without formally becoming an empire by…controlling key global 
markets and resources (Colás 2007, 6-7).” The second dimension, hierarchy, is how the 
empire controls its subjects. This is done from a capital that “…concentrates the 
institutions of imperial power and wealth, and thereby aim to command diverse and 
distant populations from a geographical centre (Colás 2007, 7).” The final dimension, 
order, is that empires provide stability, legitimate authority, and a sense of belonging or 
citizenship (Colás 2007).  
However, Colás also states that the use of force is always present in the formation 
or maintenance of an empire. In the modern age, force can be present as coercion through 
incentives or requirements. Michael W. Doyle defines an empire as “…a relationship, 
formal or informal, in which one state controls the effective political sovereignty of 
another political society. It can be achieved by force, by political collaboration, by 
economic, social or cultural dependence. Imperialism is simply the process or policy of 
establishing or maintaining an empire (Colás 2007, 11).” This definition includes more 
than formally annexed territories. It seeks to explain three characteristics that must be 
present in order to define a regime as an empire: demonstrate the existence of control, 
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explain why one regime expands and establishes an empire, and why the other party 
submits to or fails to effectively resist the regime (Colás 2007).  
Doyle (1986) also defines an empire as a “relationship between a metropole and a 
periphery linked to the metropole by a transnational society based in the 
metropole…(81).” The metropole must have three characteristics in order to have control 
over the periphery. It must have a strong central government, a strong sense of public 
legitimacy or community that is distributed throughout the entire population, and a large 
degree of social differentiation. These three characteristics are important because social 
differentiation helps create resources and public legitimacy/community helps ensure that 
these resources are seen as public.  A strong central government, however, is the most 
important factor. The metropole needs to be able to act decisively and mobilize resources. 
Its ability to extend transnationally is what distinguishes it from a mere hegemon, as it 
has more control over the internal policy of the periphery. The periphery must be weak in 
its social organization and integration to enable the metropole to exert influence (Doyle 
1986). An overview is presented below: 
Empire The political control exercised by one polity (the metropole) over the 
domestic and foreign policy and over the domestic politics of another 
polity (the periphery), resulting in control over who rules and what rulers 
can do. 
Mode (1) Formal – annexation and rule by a colonial governor with the 
collaboration of local elites. 
(2) Informal – rule through the collaboration of local rulers who are legally 
independent but politically dependent on the metropole. 
Sources The interaction of a metropole and a periphery joined together by 
transnational forces generates differences in political power which permit 
the metropole to control the periphery. This relationship is produced and 
shaped by the three necessary features, which are together sufficient. It is 
also influenced and shaped by the structure of the international system. 
 
(1) A metropole, typified by a centralized state, thorough social 
differentiation, and public legitimacy and community loyalty. 
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(2) A transnational extension of the economy, society, or culture of the 
metropole. 
(3) A periphery, which may be 
(a) tribal, typified by no central state, little social differentiation, and 
strong communal or village loyalty 
(b) patrimonial, typified by a central state, some social differentiation, 
and little communal loyalty 
(c) feudal, typified by a disaggregated state, some social differentiation, a 
common civilization, and pyramidal loyalties 
(d) fractionated, typified by a central state, thorough social 
differentiation, and a divided community with factional loyalties 
(e) settler, typified by a colonial government, thoroughly differentiated 
society, and a communal loyalty toward metropole 
(4)  An international system, which may be unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar. 
Source: Doyle 1986, 130. 
Doyle (1986) describes formal rule by an empire as being in the tradition of the 
Romans, and informal rule as following more of an Athenian outline with bribes and 
manipulation. Within the peripheries, tribal communities are usually ruled formally, 
while patrimonial feudal, and fractionated communities are ruled informally. If the 
empire exists within a bipolar system3, rule is usually informal; however, if it exists 
within a multipolar system; rule is usually formal. In order for a large empire to survive 
over a long period of time, it needs to cross the Augustan threshold.4 “Where the 
periphery was large relative to the resources of the metropole, empires persisted only if 
they were able to develop a polity that governed for the sake of the empire as a whole 
(Doyle 1986, 136-7).” Rome’s factions were threatening to divide Rome’s resources, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  Bipolar	  and	  multipolar	  systems	  describe	  the	  world’s	  power	  structure.	  In	  a	  bipolar	  system,	  two	  
hegemons	  with	  relatively	  equal	  power	  are	  in	  control.	  A	  multipolar	  system	  is	  characterized	  by	  
multiple	  states	  with	  a	  relatively	  equal	  amount	  of	  power.	  
4	  The	  Augustan	  threshold	  is	  named	  after	  Augustus,	  who	  reorganized	  the	  Roman	  Republic’s	  
bureaucracy	  to	  create	  the	  principate.	  Before	  reorganization,	  Rome	  was	  in	  danger	  of	  disintegrating	  
due	  to	  factions	  that	  were	  trying	  to	  control	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  empire.	  This	  reorganization	  allowed	  
Rome	  to	  endure	  for	  another	  four	  hundred	  years	  (Doyle	  137).	  The	  threshold	  is	  the	  turning	  point	  in	  a	  
regime’s	  existence	  where	  it	  is	  in	  serious	  danger	  of	  falling,	  but	  can	  still	  save	  itself	  if	  it	  undertakes	  
serious	  reforms.	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therefore divide the empire. Reorganization was needed to unite the factions to serve the 
empire, and not themselves. After imperial bureaucratic reorganization, continuing 
integration in political, economic, and cultural dimensions can merge the metropole and 
the periphery, like the merging of the Roman Empire in 212. At this point, an empire no 
longer exists. Instead, all of the diverse populations have been integrated into one. 
Participatory government has suffered, because bureaucratizing the metropole eliminates 
it. “Liberty and empire emerge…as opposites, for the periphery from the beginning and 
for the metropole in the end (Doyle 1986, 37). 
In his chapter on “Singular Europe,” James Anderson (2007) identifies some 
general features present in many empires: 
• gradiations of direct or indirect control or domination of peripheries; 
• expanionsist tendencies that can be characterized by moral superiority or a 
civilizing mission; 
• the danger of overextension; 
• highly differentiated and unequal spaces; 
• varying and indistinct borders; 
• heterogenuous and asymetric connections within the empire; and 
• a weak relationship between the periphery and the metropole. 
How many of these features are present in the European Union? 
Empires create peace and enable trade between territories (Anderson 2007). The 
idea that an empire creates peace is central to the formation of the European Union. This 
peace, which is followed by economic, political, and cultural prosperity, makes empires 
attractive to states on the outside of the periphery. Harold James (2006) confirms this 
idea that empires create peace. According to him, empires introduce peace, rule of law, 
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and prosperity, with the rule of law being the most important factor. The rule of law is 
important to ensure that democracy does not overtake liberalism. However, there needs to 
be some form of democracy, or consensus, to make the rule of law possible. In this 
scenario, an outside actor is needed to help balance democracy and liberalism in a newly 
formed state (James 2006). 
 Empires also create political order by establishing regional poles of stability and 
worldwide-level institutional mechanisms. Economic reforms lead to increased 
prosperity, which leads to political reforms, which leads to legitimacy for the 
government. This example can be seen in the central and eastern European enlargements 
in the European Union. These states needed an external mechanism to promote stability 
in the form of an economic reform program imposed from the outside (James 2006).  
According to Doyle (1986), no empire is permanent. There is no imperium sine 
fine – empire without end (James 2006). Empires can fall as a result of overextension by 
the core of the empire. Leaders of empires blindly believe that they must defend the 
prestige of the empire, even at distant and unimportant outposts in the empire's frontier. 
This frontier is useless economically, but vital politically and psychologically. Due to 
this, the metropole defines the core as the empire’s central strategic interest that must be 
defended at all costs. The leaders neglect other interests. This situation causes strains in 
the center, or core, and erosion of the periphery. An empire is most vulnerable at its 
periphery, which is especially difficult to identify today. Instant communication and other 
technologies mean that frontiers are everywhere, making the traditional definitions of 
borders and defense no longer the standard practice (James 2006). 
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This overextension is much easier in the modern world. Before the spread of 
modern technology, images of violence by empires led to feelings of shock and awe, 
which caused people to fear and respect the regime. Today, these images are much more 
widely distributed due to modern media. These images, instead of strengthening imperial 
power, undermine it. Higher levels of education and literacy and increased access to 
communications amplify the negative effects of imperialism. The positive effects are not 
as visible and do not make as much of an impression (James 2006). 
Doyle (1986) identifies the major cause of the fall of the Roman Empire as the 
failure to mobilize resources. External conditions in society, culture, the economy, and 
the polity deteriorated and led to the collapse of the western half of the Roman Empire. 
International factors, such as the barbarian attacks and the strategic positions of the 
territorial borders, also played a part in the collapse. Integration and the bureaucracy were 
weakened by the loss of social and economic differentiation, a sense of national 
community, and political unity. Other factors included an activist army, a corrupt, 
ineffective, and patriarchal civilian bureaucracy, as well as overburdening taxation. When 
unity disappears, so does the empire (Doyle 1986). Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) agree 
with this analysis of the decline of the Roman Empire. To them, a lack of incentives for 
technological innovation caused stagnation that severely affected society’s prosperity. 
Another major factor in the collapse of an empire is when peripheries win their 
independence. This occurs when the elite in the periphery no longer wants to collaborate 
with the metropole; they organize a national revolt after mobilizing the population of the 
periphery, much like the American Founding Fathers (Doyle 1986). The balance between 
the metropole and the periphery was no longer favorable to the British, and the metropole 
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was no longer able to respond with overwhelming force. This balance can be tipped in 
favor of the periphery if a foreign power supports the revolt, which can replace some 
nationalist mobilization. Independence also depends on the level of mobilization and the 
rate of speed at which groups can mobilize. After these conditions are met, the 
independence movement needs to create a strong sense of national identity that can 
withstand pressure by the metropole and create a central political organization to organize 
and control the movement (Doyle 1986). 
The	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire:	  A	  model?	  
	  
	   An empire has existed in Europe for over two thousand years. The Roman 
Empire, perhaps the most famous empire, started its decline in the fifth century AD, but 
its legacy lived on. The Holy Roman Empire was the successor to the Roman Empire in 
Europe. It can be argued that special elements of the Holy Roman Empire can be seen 
today in the European Union. The fragmented and diffused sovereignty, inability to 
locate a sovereign, dependence on soft power and social networks, and its ability to 
accommodate a wide variety of constitutional practices seem to provide a link from the 
Holy Roman Empire to the European Union (James 2006). Here, I will discuss the 
evolution of the Holy Roman Empire, and how its growth impacted Europe. 
The	  Roman	  Empire:	  The	  legend	  lives	  on	  
	  
	   The idea of the Roman Empire has been romanticized in popular culture. Popular 
Halloween costumes are created in the ‘Roman’ or ‘Grecian’ style, and the image of an 
emperor laying decadently on a lounge while being hand fed grapes is widespread in TV 
shows and movies. A famous play called A Funny Thing Happened on the Way to the 
Forum is a lighthearted and humorous story set in the Roman Empire. The image of the 
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‘glorious’ Roman Empire has also lived on in the minds of humankind as an ideal to 
strive for. 
 Robert Folz  (1969) describes the concept of empire as existing at two levels: the 
realm of the mind and the realm of poltics. The realm of the mind consists of religious 
and philosophical thought. The popular thought at the time of the fall of the Roman 
Empire and the beginning of what we now call the Holy Roman Empire was that empire 
is universal. Greek philosophers believed that “all mankind formed one community, 
partaking of universal reason (Folz 1969, 4).” The Greeks thought of the Roman Empire 
and the universal community of mankind as one that would lead to a union of all people 
to give peace, order, and justice to the world. These ideas impacted the Roman elites, 
who adopted this way of thinking about their government. Christianity also supported the 
Roman Empire as an ideal by supporting its mission as above reproach and holy (Folz 
1969). This connection is seen more prominently, with more conflict, in the Holy Roman 
Empire. 
 Politically, the term imperium, as discussed in the first section, meant authority 
over all others, which was attributed to the emperor. In particular, it was the lands that 
were ruled by the Roman Empire. The term imperator was eventually reserved 
exclusively for the emperor to distinguish him from the kings of other nations. By the fall 
of the empire, however, the definition of emperor had come to mean a hegemon who 
exercised authority over all other kingdoms. This hegemon did not necessarily have to be 
Roman (Folz 1969).  
The	  role	  of	  religion	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 The concepts of Populus christianus and Imperium christianum were dual notions 
of the Christian empire. The former meant that Charlemagne was the ruler of all Christian 
peoples, placing him on a universal plane, while the latter referred to the Frankish 
monarchy. The pope created the beginning of the Holy Roman Empire by crowning 
Charlemagne in 800. Christianity gave his empire its stability and character; it was “first 
and foremost a religious view of the order of the world (Folz 1969, 25).” Charlemagne’s 
successor continued this tradition by identifying the empire’s mission as the “triumph of 
Christianity (Folz 1969, 27).” This role, at the end of the ninth century, evolved into the 
defender of the Church. Its purpose was to now defend the institution of the Church from 
its internal and external enemies (Folz 1969).  
In the second half of the twelfth century, Pope Innocent III attempted to reaffirm 
the pope’s role as superior to that of the emperor by asserting the pope’s right to select 
new rulers of the empire. He wanted to avoid hereditary succession, so he recognized the 
right of German princes to elect their king because they had received that privilege when 
Pope Leo III crowned Charlemagne emperor. However, the election did not make the 
king the emperor. The Pope still needed to approve the princes’ choice, making the 
emperor subordinate to the Pope. This subordinate, or vassal, position, led to a decline in 
the prestige of the empire as the pope was seen as the real emperor. The emperor of the 
Holy Roman Empire was no more than the battle arm of the papacy (Folz 1969). 
This perception had begun to change by the 1300s, when Dante wrote Book III of 
his Monarchia. He argued that the emperor was not subordinate to the pope; the Church 
came after the Empire, and only had jurisdiction over spiritual matters, whereas the 
Empire “had its source in God alone (Folz 1969, 142).” The Church and the Empire were 
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seen as two equal institutions, with the emperor responsible for the present life and 
Church responsible for the afterlife. A separation between Church and State was evolving 
(Folz 1969). 
In 1324, Marsilius of Padua wrote the Defensor pacis, a work that clarified 
sovereignty as belonging to the state, not the Church. Marsilius argued that all authority 
was of human origin and that “divine intervention was only necessary to ensure its 
operation (Folz 1969, 143).” He described the priests as people who were equal and 
accused the Church of crimes against the people and the state. Furthermore, the Church 
only existed through the state. He advocated a different interpretation of the crowning of 
Charlemagne by Pope Leo III. It was not Pope Leo who chose to crown Charlemagne, 
but it was the Romans who ordered the pope to perform the ceremony (Folz 1969). 
However, a common religion was what kept the Holy Roman Empire from falling for so 
many years (James 2006). This shared ideology was important in cultivating a united 
purpose. Religion, as a shared interest, can be an important factor in the formation of both 
empires and regimes. 
The	  historical	  significance	  of	  Rome	  
	  
In 787, Charlemagne declared himself to be a powerful ruler in his own right by 
evoking memories of the ancient Roman Empire, but did not call himself an emperor. He 
did not use that title until after 800, when the Church proclaimed him to be one. It is 
possible that Pope Leo III made Charlemagne the emperor in the West in order to balance 
or replace the empire in the East. This is a similarity that can be seen in the origins of the 
European Union, where a capitalist, western-leaning political organization was needed to 
balance the empire that the Soviet Union was building. The title that Charlemagne 
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adopted was reminiscent of Rome. He used the memories of Rome to give his empire 
authenticity, but did not make it the center. He called himself ‘Romanum gubernans 
Imperium et rex Francorum et Langobardorum,’ or ‘Emperor in in charge of the Roman 
Empire and King of the Franks and Langobards.’ At the end of the ninth century, an 
admiration for the old Rome swept through the empire. Rome was depicted as gilded and 
splendid and as the capital of the world (Folz 1969). The symbolic significance of Rome 
is seen again, much later, with the Treaty of Rome. 
How	  did	  it	  function?	  
	  
 Sovereignty in the Holy Roman Empire was difficult to discern. Harold James 
(2006) describes it as fragmented and diffused. The sovereign could not be located; was it 
the emperor, the pope, or one of the kings or princes? It expanded through the use of soft 
power rather than military campaigns. The social networks that it created offered 
collaboration and identity. It had its own judicial system, a system of election for the 
emperor, and an unspoken agreement that states within the empire should not declare war 
on each other (James 2006). 
After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, it became more difficult to identify the 
Holy Roman Empire. Instead, Europe was a collection of nation-states that were 
sovereign in their own right. At this point, the ruler of Austria was always elected 
emperor. To balance the Austrian empire, Prussia created an alliance system. The Holy 
Roman Empire officially fell in 1806 in a defeat by Napoleon. James Muldoon (1999) 
sums up the Holy Roman Empire eloquently: 
“It is important to realize that although the history of the empire from 800 
to 1806 appears to be a relatively straightforward, indeed linear, 
development, in fact it was not. The empire was revived – or reinvented – 
several times in its career. Each of these imperial revivals, although rooted 
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in an imperial tradition, created a somewhat different concept of empire 
than had existed previously. Rather than being linear, the concept of 
empire is a series of interrelated layers, like geological strata (30).” 
 
Is this non-linear development reminiscent of the stops and starts of modern European 
integration? 
Other	  integration	  theories:	  Regime	  Formation	  
	  
While the EU could possibly have a structure similar to that of an empire, and be 
expanding like an empire, there are alternative theories to its formation. A relatively new 
theory that is applicable to the European Union is regime formation theory. Here, I 
discuss Robert Keohane’s5 theory of regime formation as a result of international 
cooperation as a main source. I then break down his theory by including Mattli’s theory 
of regional cooperation to make it more specific for an organization like the European 
Union. I also include additional sources to provide a complete picture of cooperation 
theory and a section on the theory of disintegration. 
Keohane’s	  Framework	  
Keohane (2005) identifies several factors that are critical to the emergence and 
functioning of international regimes: interdependence, a liberal democratic economy, 
transparency and interaction factors, and technology and the removal of barriers. 
Interdependence was clarified as specifically economic interdependence, which creates a 
demand for international institutions and rules. The market crosses borders when 
overlapping jurisdictions create a need for uniform rules or some sort of agreement to 
regulate commerce. As interdependence increases and states become more intertwined, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  I	  will	  be	  using	  Robert	  Keohane’s	  interpretation	  of	  regime	  formation	  theory.	  Keohane	  is	  one	  of	  the	  
‘founding	  fathers’	  of	  regime	  formation	  theory.	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more areas normally under solely nation-state control become subject to regulation 
through spillover effects. Lobbying by businesses in both states for uniform rules and 
regulations also leads to agreements, whether for profit maximization or to get the 
government to control externalities (Keohane 2005). 
A liberal democratic economy is the type of government and/or economy that is 
the most successful in entering and maintaining agreements, because the markets and 
democracy strengthen each other. According to Immanuel Kant, democracies do not fight 
one another. Instead, they prefer peaceful relations, peaceful solutions to conflict, and are 
more likely to abide by international agreements. This is called the democratic peace. 
Keohane (2005) also specifies what characteristics the economy must have. It must be 
dynamic, based on freedom, private property, and long-term contracts. The economy 
must be autonomous, with regulatory competition due to decentralized authority, internal 
representation, and moral reform. The transnational networks that come from a liberal 
market economy are created by the increasing contact between private citizens and NGOs 
due to across-border relations. This increase in contact strengthens the relationship 
between the two countries, in addition to creating a lobby. Additionally, wealth in a 
liberal democratic economy is based on industry, not land, so there is less potential for 
warfare because neither country is trying to expand geographically (Keohane 2005).  
Transparency and interaction, the third factor in the emergence and functioning of 
international regimes, occur when there is certainty, available information, 
communication, and repetitiveness within the international regime. This occurs through a 
combination of trade and personal relationships. Improved technology, the fourth factor, 
leads to increased contact and trade, which leads to the gradual removal of barriers and 
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subsequent liberalization of trade. As trade is liberalized, economic growth increases and 
overlapping spheres of influence are created (Keohane 2005). These last two factors 
complement each other. Improvements in technology lead to more trade and also more 
transparency, while increased interaction leads to more collaboration, which helps further 
improve technology. 
Keohane (2005) cites several reasons for how international regimes endure, even 
if states are rational egoists who are only concerned about themselves. Even when it is 
against their “myopic self-interest,” states comply with international rulings and 
agreements. This is a result of two main reasons. First, existing regimes become easier to 
maintain. States view the creation of the regime as a sunk cost, which would be lost if the 
regime were to be dismantled. Second, regimes create issue linkages. If one regime is 
dismantled, it could negatively affect another. States are also concerned about their 
reputations. If they break a rule, then it could promote other rule violations. Lowering 
their reputation makes it more difficult to enter into advantageous agreements (Keohane 
2005). 
Keohane (2005) also writes about empathetic explanations for cooperation. He 
notes that governments who view themselves as empathetic are more likely to try to 
cooperate, and that even when a government isn’t really altruistic, pretending to be so 
actually causes the state to become slightly altruistic in order to avoid cognitive 
dissonance. Additionally, being empathetic leads to an unbalanced exchange. At first 
glance, this might seem to be against the state’s self-interest. However, unbalanced 
exchanges set the stage for future interactions and more cooperation in order to repay 
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debts. If an exchange were balanced, there would be no debt, and no incentive for future 
interaction (Keohane 2005). 
Mattli’s	  Framework	   	  
According to Mattli (1999), there are two necessary conditions involved in the 
decision to create a regime. The first one, potential gains, occurs when the economic 
gains from market exchanges within a region are significant. This is helped by the 
diffusion of new technologies, which can increase gains. As gains increase along with the 
spread of technology, lobbying for regional institutional arrangements is created. This 
lobbying is a driving force behind the creation of regimes. Regional institution building 
can be viewed as attempting to internalize externalities that affect a group of countries. 
The cost of these externalities increases as new technologies raise the potential for gain 
from market exchanges, thus increasing the payoffs from regional rules, regulation, and 
policies. According to property-right theory, the demand for institutional change comes 
from the people with the greatest opportunity cost from the current institutional structure. 
New technologies also decrease transaction cost. As technology improves, specialization 
increases which causes organizational innovation, which leads to a cycle of technological 
improvement and organizational innovation to get the most potential gains out of the new 
technology. Informal integration, which is patterns of interactions and exchanges 
triggered by formal framework and amplified by technological advance and market 
dynamics, creates demand for further formal integration, which is an institutional 
framework established by treaties, to manage their impact (Mattli 1999). 
The second condition is that there must be a fulfillment of supply conditions, 
which means that leaders must be willing and able to accommodate demands for the 
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creation of a regime. The willingness of leaders depends on the payoff. They are not 
likely to give up sovereignty if their country is already economically successful. Doing so 
would be political suicide, and the leader would not be reelected. Leaders can be willing, 
but unable to create regimes, due to collective action problems. In the prisoner’s 
dilemma, iterated games create issue linkage, making cooperation more likely, but an 
enforcement mechanism, or commitment institution, is still necessary. In coordination 
games, neither state can choose its best policy without knowing what the other intends to 
do, but there is no obvious point at which to coordinate. In n-country coordination games, 
having a benevolent leader helps with coordination, and also eases distributional 
consequences. This leads to the second supply condition, which is that the presence of an 
undisputed leader country among the group of countries seeking to create a regime helps 
facilitate integration (Mattli 1999). 
Mattli (1999) also describes a third condition that is helpful, but not completely 
necessary, in the creation of a regime. The establishment of commitment institutions, 
through centralized monitoring or third party enforcement, improves compliance by 
acting as a constraint on countries that would otherwise break the rules. However, 
cooperation is still possible without commitment institutions based on repeat-play, issue-
linkage, and reputation (Mattli 1999). The role of commitment institutions in establishing 
regimes often interacts with one of Mattli’s other factors, such as lobbying by businesses. 
Where	  Keohane’s	  Theory	  Works	  
Bounded rationality is a theory that incorporates human error. Keohane (2005) 
uses it to explain how cooperation really occurs. The decisionmakers within states are 
limited by their own cognitive abilities, because they are not capable of using all of the 
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information available to them. Decisionmakers “satisfice.” They keep looking for a 
course of action only until they find one that is satisfactory, instead of searching for the 
best one. Organizations operate in the same way, because they have multiple goals to 
achieve among possibly many different actors. Second, actors follow “rules of thumb” 
provided by international regimes to make decisions. Last, humans make the decisions, 
not states. Therefore, sometimes the course of action that is taken is one that is designed 
to limit the future choices of the opposing political party. By “tying the hands” of future 
governments with international regimes, the current government is ensuring that its’ 
policy preferences will be upheld because of the costs associated with breaking an 
international agreement (Keohane 2005). 
This part of Keohane’s theory ties directly into Mattli’s. Mattli (1999) believes 
that the willingness and ability of leaders in creating a regime is one of the most 
important factors in the creation of a regime. This is very similar to bounded rationality, 
because humans are making decisions, not states. It is interesting that Keohane makes 
this distinction late in his argument. Previously, most of his theory was centered on state 
actions, such as the characteristics of states and why states try to maintain regimes. 
Certainly, personal preferences played an important part in the formation of the EU. 
Politicians in the German government wanted to join the ECSC in order to gain 
international acceptance and get rid of a regulatory agency imposed on their coal and 
steel industry. The French wanted to be able to control Germany, and politicians in the 
Benelux states realized that they could not afford to be left out of the agreement (Bache, 
George, and Bulmer 2011). 
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Keohane’s theory, in general, provides a good overview of the workings of 
international regimes. However, it is nearly impossible to make one theory applicable to 
each and every regime that is created. Large parts of Keohane’s theory help explain the 
formation and continuation of European integration, such as his emphasis on 
transparency and interaction, issue linkage, concerns about reputation, having a liberal 
democratic economy, being interdependent, and technology and the removal of barriers. 
In order to fully explain European integration, Keohane’s regime formation theory needs 
to be expanded to include the value of a hegemon in creating and maintaining regimes, as 
well as more of a focus on the role of non-state actors such as businesses, and 
commitment institutions. Mattli’s theory provides much of the missing information that 
should be incorporated into Keohane’s theory to get a more complete theory for the 
formation and continuation of the European Union. 
Other	  Factors	  for	  the	  Continuation	  of	  a	  Regime	  
R. J. Harrison (1974) hypothesizes that integration, when identified as a long-term 
goal to be achieved incrementally, is related to the mechanisms of control and consensus 
formation. Societies depend on two mechanisms, control and consensus formation, for 
resolution of conflicts over goals. These goals vary depending on the level of political 
involvement. In the case of extreme control, society is run by a totalitarian, one-party 
state. In this absolute mechanism, there is a higher capacity for guided transformation, 
due to the total control wielded by the dictator or ruling party, but the state is more 
susceptible to policy failures. The controlling figure either becomes more aggressive in 
dealing with expressions of discontent or, in an industrial totalitarian society, the inability 
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to predict the future accurately in order to implement the correct plan also leads to policy 
failure (Harrison 1974).  
Total consensus formation consists of institutions that bring together different 
interests and produce agreement on policy honored by all parties. The parties involved in 
the state or regime can concede defeat without altering their views. This permissive 
consensus is a mechanism for compromise. However, this form often results in only 
incremental change. Too much consensus can cause the organization to be too passive 
and drifting, with no real policy direction or consistency. There can be a total lack of a, or 
a very low, guided transformation capacity. A mix of both control and consensus 
formation is necessary in integration strategy in order to set long-term goals, sustain those 
goals, and adjust them. An on-going process of continuing attitude and policy 
modification vs. a massive unyielding unity of purpose on goals occurs in transforming 
systems that must revise their policy due to unforeseen consequences and environmental 
surprises. Factors that make a continuous, adjustable process possible are:  
• societal bonds and links between members of society, often illustrated through 
organizations; 
• a specialized structure for the process to take place, such as in a political unit; 
• a multi-tier structure of consensus building, from both top-down and bottom-
up; and 
• the spread of activity through lower and upper tiers of consensus formation, 
which hopefully includes all “affected collectivities.” 
These factors of consensus building are affected by the amount of social control. Parties 
and interest groups play a large role in in trying to influence or control decision-making 
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procedures. This control can be coercive or alienating. These controls must be altered to 
improve consensus formation and integration (Harrison 1974).  
Conditions	  for	  Fragmentation	  
 Like an empire, regimes can fall. In this case, however, regimes are more likely to 
disintegrate over time. Disintegration occurs when there is discord or disagreement 
among the states that are cooperating. Ward and Lofdahl (1995) identify several factors 
that could lead to the disintegration of a regional community: 
• extended military commitments; 
• an increase in political participation on the part of a previously passive 
group; 
• the growth of ethnic or linguistic differentiation; 
• prolonged economic decline or stagnation; 
• relative closure of elites; 
• excessive delay in social, economic, or political reforms; and 
• failure of a privileged group to adjust to its loss of dominance. 
They conducted a study that identified five variables that affect the outcome of 
integration: elite values, societal benefits, societal costs, complexity, and integration. 
These variables will either positively or negatively affect behavior in a loop pattern. 
Elites can positively affect integration by supporting it because they get benefits from 
integration. This support by elites also leads to societal benefits. However, integration 
can lead to greater complexity. Increased complexity makes it more difficult to anticipate 
the consequences of additional integration as benefits become harder to distinguish and 
costs become more visible. This can cause elites to not value integration as highly 
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because the increased complexity causes actors to take more time to agree on a course of 
action, which leads to economic stagnation (Ward and Lofdahl 1995). 
Cederman (1995) also addresses the issue of disintegration. He describes power as 
a combination of scale and intensity. Scale is defined as the physical, demographic, or 
economic size of the unity, while intensity is defined as inspiring participation and 
loyalty, cohesion, and commitment. This definition of intensity also has a quantitative 
element: active participation and loyalty of actors leads to the maximization of resources 
for the regime, making power legitimate. In Cederman’s model, the amount of power 
held by an actor is the product of scale and intensity. According to his model, in the 
modern world, intensity has increased dramatically due to technological and 
organizational innovations. This has shifted the optimal size of an actor from an empire 
to the nation-state. This outcome suggests a conflict between widening and deepening of 
regional integration. The larger the scale of integration, the less intensity that is possible. 
A smaller scale allows for greater intensity, which in turn allows deeper integration 
(Cederman 1995). 
Tentative	  Conclusions	  
 An empire implies an administrative structure where everything is controlled from 
the metropole, whereas a regime is a set of rules and procedures converging around 
shared goals. These two definitions provide two very different ways of looking at 
integration. An empire implies much more control and rigidity in the structure, while a 
regime implies more choice and consensus. In an empire, enlargement can be achieved 
through force and coercion or through peaceful means, making it similar in style to 
regime building. For a regime, enlargement is done though agreements and cooperation. 
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In this empire vs. regime debate, which one best explains the European Union? In 
the next chapter, I apply both theories to the formation and continuation of the EU. At 
first glance, it appears that the EU is an empire, especially with its history of 
enlargement, held together by a common ideology that is the legacy of the Holy Roman 
Empire. Jan Zielonka (2006) provides a comprehensive analysis of EU enlargement as 
empire building, which will be discussed in the next chapter. However, the role of 
religion can also be explained by regime formation theory, as a shared interest that 
contributes to issue linkages and interaction factors. But can empire theory explain how 
the European Union formed? Or does regime theory provide a more convincing 
argument? I will prove that the European Union cannot be solely understood in terms of 
an empire. 
	  
	   	  
	  
32	  
Chapter	  2:	  So	  what	  is	  the	  European	  Union?	  
	  
European integration is not a new idea. In the interwar period, the French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs, Aristide Briand, proposed a political union of the European states in 
order to secure peace and economic prosperity in Europe. However, his idea was not 
popular, and he was not reelected (Merriman and Winter 2006). After World War II, 
there was an attempt to create a European Union of Federalists (EUF) in 1946. The EUF 
wanted to create a European Constitution, but it took until 1947 to organize a conference, 
but by then, national governments had already been restored (Bache, George and Bulmer 
2011). The Constitution did not happen because national governments were more 
interested in establishing their own sovereignty. An attempt at European cooperation was 
made again at the Hague Congress in 1948, which was attended by future leaders in 
European integration, where the Council of Europe was created. However, there was no 
dominant national government to steer the Congress, so nothing more substantial came 
out of the process (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). 
The Cold War was a major driver in the beginning of the current European 
integration project. The U.S. needed to balance the power of the Soviet Union and 
prevent it from expanding. Europe, which was still struggling to recover from two back-
to-back world wars, was in danger of falling into the hands of the communists. Two 
major policies from the U.S. were intended to ensure that Europe remained firmly within 
western influence. The Truman Doctrine, a result of Soviet involvement in the Greek 
communist war, stated that the U.S. would support Greece and Turkey in their fight 
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against the communists to keep them from coming under Soviet influence. This support 
was given through economic and military aid (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011).  
This containment policy was also the reason for the second essential policy, the 
1947 Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan provided economic and food aid to help with 
economic recovery, which was slow to take off after WWII. Aid was offered to all 
European countries, including the Soviet Union, but only the western European countries 
chose to take the aid, due to the strings attached. If countries accepted aid from the 
Marshall Plan, they had to become part of the OEEC, where the countries, as a group, 
would decide how to distribute the aid. The idea was for the countries to make the 
decisions themselves, but there was a heavy U.S. influence in the proceedings. The U.S. 
was also instrumental in supporting the reunification of western Germany in order to 
balance the eastern half of the country, which was under Soviet control (Bache, George 
and Bulmer 2011). This heavy U.S. hand continued to heavily influence European 
integration, in a way that will be discussed in further detail in the section on the role of 
hegemons in the EU. 
The U.S. was also instrumental in orchestrating cooperation on the 1950 Schuman 
Plan, which led to the Treaty of Paris. The first major integration undertaking, the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), was motivated by security concerns and a 
desire for continued peace. The French wanted assurance that Germany would not be able 
to start a war, so they supported the creation of the ECSC, which would prevent Germany 
from using the two essential materials in warfare, coal and steel, for non-peaceful 
purposes. Germany, on the other hand, was eager to establish a reputation that was not 
related to the sins of its past. The Benelux countries – Belgium, the Netherlands, and 
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Luxembourg – could not afford to not join the ECSC for economic reasons (Bache, 
George and Bulmer 2011).  
The ECSC was the beginning of the European Union. Can we determine what 
type of organization the European Union is? Is it an empire, a state, or something new 
entirely? Other integration schemes have been attempted in other regions of the world, 
such as Latin America, that are based on the European model. What makes European 
integration so unique is that it is three-dimensional. Integration goes across issues, from 
the economy to politics, and goes deeper with the Eurozone. It also continues to expand 
geographically, with the latest addition being Croatia in 2013. But does this make it an 
empire? Or are other factors contributing to its expansion? In this chapter, I will examine 
what makes so many people think that the EU resembles an empire. I will then look at 
regime formation theory to get an alternative perspective on this peculiar grouping of 
states. 
To	  what	  extent	  is	  the	  European	  Union	  an	  empire?	  
	  
The European Union has been compared to its predecessor, the Holy Roman 
Empire. Is this new organization of European nation-states a modern form of empire? By 
tracing major events in European integration to compare them to the emergence of an 
empire, we will see how similar the evolution of the European Union is to the emergence 
of an empire, specifically the Holy Roman Empire. Then the characteristics of the 
European Union will be examined to see if they fulfill the characteristics of an empire 
that were discussed in the previous chapter. 
Similarities	  to	  the	  Holy	  Roman	  Empire	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 Harold James (2006) provides an overview of how the European Union is 
analogous to the Holy Roman Empire, or how the EU can be seen as the Holy Roman 
Empire’s successor. He identifies the most obvious shared characteristic as constitutional 
openness. The Holy Roman Empire was made up of a collection of states, each with their 
own laws and customs. The EU allows for the devolution authority to member states over 
regions under their control. He then moves into a discussion about the role of religion. 
Religion was the shared ideology that made the Holy Roman Empire ‘holy.’ It kept the 
empire together by preventing truly independent, sovereign nation-states from forming. 
In contrast, the constitution that was drafted and signed for the EU completely ignored 
God. It was very consciously written in anti-religious terms (James 2006).  
However, glimmers of symbolism from the legacy of the Holy Roman Empire are 
seen throughout European integration. The Treaty of Rome was signed in Rome, evoking 
the memory of the Roman Empire and the Catholic Church. The flag that was chosen for 
the Council of Europe, with its twelve stars, is thought to be a reference to a passage in 
the Book of Revelations. The fathers or “saints” of European integration (Konrad 
Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Robert Schuman) thought that “the social doctrine of 
the Catholic Church…was a better guide to twentieth-century politics than the secular 
debates of the nation-state (James 2006, 137).” Another view, at the time, was that the 
church “was a major counterpole to the state and its tradition of violence (James 2006, 
137).” James (2006) describes the European Union integration project as the “Holy 
Roman Empire in denial (140).” He says that it is a continuation of the history of empire 
building and imperialism in Europe. 
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In order for an empire to emerge, it must have a strong center that it able to 
support expansion. In order to have a thriving state, nation, republic, monarchy, or city-
state, the metropole must have had inclusive institutions. Can inclusive institutions be 
found in the beginnings of European integration? The OEEC allowed the western 
European countries to decide how to invest and spend the money from the Marshall Plan 
(Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). However, this interpretation makes the U.S. seem like 
the metropole, or the emperor, with Europe as its periphery. The ECSC made the German 
coal and steel industry more inclusive by opening it up to competition. Political 
inclusiveness typically follows economic inclusiveness in a pattern that is explained 
through regime formation theory with issue linkages and spillover effects. As time went 
by, collaboration began to include political issues. However, Acemoglu and Robinson’s 
(2012) analysis stated that the switch to empire made Roman institutions more extractive. 
That does not appear to be the case with the European Union. 
Major	  Integration	  Benchmarks	  
	  
The evolution of modern European integration follows a path from purely 
economic integration to eventually include deeper integration into the political sphere, as 
well as wider geographic integration. Four major milestones in integration history 
illustrate this evolution: The Treaties of Rome, the Single European Act, the Treaty on 
European Union (Maastricht), and the Treaty of Lisbon. 
The	  Treaties	  of	  Rome	  
	  
The 1957 Treaties of Rome established the European Economic Community 
(EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). These two treaties were 
a continuation of the economic integration begun with the European Coal and Steel 
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Community (ECSC). Like the ECSC, Euratom was established in order to regulate an 
energy sector. The EEC had a much loftier goal. It was established in order to create a 
common market with four freedoms: the freedom of movement of labor, capital, goods, 
and services. The countries that signed the treaty were also responsible for creating 
common policies in areas like agriculture and transport, and ensuring freedom of 
competition within the EEC. The original six countries that signed the Treaty of Paris on 
the ECSC also signed the Treaties of Rome – France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). 	  
The	  Single	  European	  Act	  
	  
The 1985 Single European Act (SEA) was a turning point for European 
integration. It furthered economic integration through its goal of completing the common 
market, established in the Treaty of Rome, by 1992. It was also the first treaty to 
successfully integrate political ideals into the EEC. Some notable political provisions are: 
• introducing qualified majority voting (QMV) for single-market measures; 
• increasing the power of the European Parliament in QMV areas; 
• incorporating political cooperation into a treaty for the first time; and 
• incorporating text that read a commitment to „transform relations as a whole among their 
States into a European Union (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). 
The	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	  (TEU):	  Maastricht	  
	  
 This treaty created what we know today as the European Union by establishing 
three pillars: the European Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and 
Justice and Home Affairs. It created the goal of establishing a single currency, now 
known as the Euro. It also strengthened the power of the European Parliament, created a 
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Committee of the Regions and Local Authorities to allow other levels of government to 
participate in European affairs, and created the concept of European citizenship. The 
TEU was the first treaty to include major political integration (Bache, George and Bulmer 
2011). 
The	  Treaty	  of	  Lisbon	  
	  
 The Treaty of Lisbon was signed in 2007 after the failure to ratify the 
Constitutional Treaty. It is very similar to the Constitutional Treaty, but does not contain 
the same language. For example, terms like “constitution” were left out of the Lisbon 
Treaty, as well as some of the more controversial provisions. It significantly altered the 
institutional structure of the European Union and increased the power of the European 
Union as an institution. It included all of the characteristics of a federal state, which the 
EU is not. This attempt to make the European Union into a federal state can be seen 
through provisions like giving more power to the European Parliament, changing the 
voting procedures in the Council, a citizens’ initiative, a permanent president of the 
European Council, a new High Representative for Foreign Affairs, and a new EU 
diplomatic service. Additionally, the Lisbon Treaty also clarifies the relationship between 
the member states and the EU by delegating which powers belong to each and which of 
these powers are shared (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). 
 The changes in the voting procedures were the extension of qualified majority 
voting (QMV) and the agreement on the future use of a ‘double majority’ system. In 
delegating powers, some powers were expanded for the European Parliament, while the 
size of the European Commission was reduced and national parliaments were given a 
greater role. The Charter of Fundamental Rights was made to be binding to member 
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states and the three-pillar system was eliminated in favor of a more integrated and 
simplified system by incorporating all pillars into the EU (Bache, George and Bulmer 
2011). 
Structure	  and	  characteristics	  
	  
Does the European Union fulfill the characteristics set out in the different theories 
on empire discussed in the first chapter? Doyle (1886) discusses the mode of empire: 
formal and informal. The European Union is an informal empire because it allows the 
leaders of individual nation-states to be independent from the central organization. It was 
created in a bipolar world, where the two main powers were the United States and the 
Soviet Union, which Doyle (1986) says tends more towards informal empire rule.  
Anderson (2007) highlights some other characteristics that are present in the 
European Union: expansionist tendencies that are support by a moral ideology, the 
danger of overextension, varying borders, and a weak relationship between the periphery 
and the metropole. The European Union does fulfill some of these characteristics. Part of 
the reason for the Eastern enlargements was to support the development of stability and 
democratic institutions in the countries that were suddenly free from the Soviet Empire. 
Overextension is a possibility. Should the European Union allow further expansion? This 
will be discussed in the section below on enlargement. The strength of the relationship 
between the metropole and the periphery will be discussed in terms of legitimacy and 
community in the section below on citizen identity and opinions. 
Doyle (1986) also laid out three necessary characteristics for an empire: a strong 
central government, legitimacy/community, and a large amount of social differentiation. 
Does the European Union have a strong central government? Is there a strong sense of 
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European identity, or community? Is there social differentiation? I will attempt to answer 
these three questions in the sections below.  
European	  Union	  institutions	  
	  
Do the main institutions in the European Union have the power necessary to form 
a strong central government? The main institutions are the European Parliament, Council, 
Commission, and the Court of Justice. The Court of Justice, in particular, is a strong 
institution. It had steadily been expanding its power and that of the EU through landmark 
cases such as Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie de Belastingen (1963), 
which established the principle that EU law has a direct impact not only on the member 
states, but also on the citizens of the member states. This allowed individuals to bring 
cases to European courts. Another case, Costa v. ENEL (1964), established the principle 
that EU law has supremacy over national law (Flamini 2012). The Treaty of Lisbon 
strengthened the other political institutions, as architects of the treaty tried to make the 
EU more like a federal state by giving the institutions more decision-making power. 
European	  identity	  and	  opinions	  
	  
In a Eurobarometer 78 survey, the majority of respondents felt that they were 
citizens of the European Union. The same question was asked four times since 2010. 
Consistently, as shown in Figure 2.1, the majority of Europeans feel that they are citizens 
of the EU. In Figure 2.2, most respondents thought that the EU is going in the right 
direction. When asked if they thought that it would be easier for their country to face the 
future outside of the EU, a majority of Europeans (58%) disagreed, meaning that they 
consider EU membership important for the future of their country. However, Europeans 
are not optimistic about democracy in the EU. Of the respondents, 45% are dissatisfied 
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with the way democracy works in the EU, while only 44% are satisfied, with 11% 
expressing no opinion. Since 2009, the respondents’ answers to this question have shown 
a downward trend in satisfaction with democracy in the EU – positive answers have 
fallen by ten points, while negative answers have risen by thirteen points. An 
overwhelming majority of Europeans (64% in Autumn 2012 and 63% in Spring 2012) do 
not believe that their voice counts in the EU. On the other hand, a majority of respondents 
surveyed in Autumn 2012 (60%), said that ‘democratic’ described the EU very well. 
However, responses to the same question show an eight percentage drop from Autumn 
2010. Additionally, an increase of four percent of respondents (to 51%) from Autumn 
2010 believe that ‘technocratic’ describes the EU (EB 78, Public Opinion in the EU). 
Figure	  1.1	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The European Union’s motto, first used in 2000, is “United in diversity (European 
Union).” It has twenty-four official and working languages (European Commission 
2013). The creation of the single market allowed the free movement of people to work 
and live in other countries. Enlargements result in an influx of immigrants from the new 
member states. This diversity contributes to a large amount of social differentiation 
within the European Union, although most citizens are connected by a common ideology: 
Christianity. However, the larger number of immigrants from Northern Africa and Arab 
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Enlargement:	  Building	  an	  empire	  or	  merely	  cooperation?	  
One of the dominant characteristics of an empire is constant expansion. The 
European Union has certainly expanded several times throughout its history, with the 
latest addition being Croatia in 2013. The enlargements have occurred because states are 
attracted to the European Union. The states in the Northern enlargement wanted the 
economic benefits of belonging to the European Economic Community. The Southern 
and Eastern enlargements were based on promoting stability in the candidate states. 
These developing states needed the stability and economic benefits that integration would 
provide (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). This proclivity for expansion appears to have 
the trappings of an empire. Jan Zielonka argues that enlargement characterizes the EU as 
a neo-medieval empire. 
Zielonka (2006) believes that enlargement makes the European Union a neo-
medieval empire instead of a Westphalian state. In fact, he believes that a European 
federal system is close to impossible. Using a normative approach, he uses features of the 
current structure to describe how the European Union is more like an empire. He 
provides a list of features to contrast the two prevailing views of the European Union, as 
a “Westphalian superstate” and a neo-medieval empire (Zielonka 2006). 
 
 
Westphalian Superstate Neo-Medieval Empire 
Hard and fixed external border lines Soft-border zones in flux 
Relatively high socio-economic 
homogeneity 
Socio-economic discrepancies persist without 
consistent patterns 
A pan-European cultural identity 
prevails 
Multiple cultural identities coexist 
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Overlap between legal, administrative, 
economic, and military regimes 
Disassociation between authoritative allocations, 
functional competencies, and territorial 
constituencies 
A clear hierarchical structure with one 
centre of authority 
Interpenetration of various types of political units 
and loyalties 
Distinction between EU members and 
non-members is sharp and important 
Distinction between the European centre and 
periphery is most crucial, but blurred 
Redistribution centrally regulated 
within a closed EU system 
Redistribution based on various types of solidarity 
between various transnational networks 
One single type of citizenship Diversified types of citizenship with different sets of 
rights and duties 
A single European army and police 
force 
Multiplicity of various overlapping military and 
police institutions 
Absolute sovereignty regained Divided sovereignty along different functional and 
territorial lines 
Source: Zielonka 2006, 12. 
 
 
He then delves further into his theory by differentiating between two possible 
types of empires that the EU could resemble. He argues that, based on its current features, 





Major Features Neo-Westphalian 
Empire 
Neo-Medieval Empire 
Mode of territorial 
acquisition 
Conquest Invitation 
Governance structure Centralized Polycentric 
Type of control Coercion and bribes Incentives or their denial 
Means of control Military and political Economic and bureaucratic 
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Borders between metropolis 
and periphery 
Clear and sharp Fuzzy 
Power relations between 
metropolis and periphery 
Perpetual assumption 
and hierarchy 
Periphery gradually gains access to 
decision-making of the metropolis 
Degree of universalism High Low 
Sovereignty in the periphery Constrained or denied 
altogether 
Constrained through sharing 
Source: Zielonka 2006, 14. 
 
 
Zielonka (2006) uses his characteristics of a neo-medieval and neo-Westphalian 
empire to analyze the European Union after the eastern enlargement. What he finds lends 
credence to his theory that the EU resembles an empire that is more medieval than 
Westphalian. In his first example, he examines whether the enlargement built peace, 
democracy, and a free market in place of the former communist regimes. He finds that 
enlargement did help establish new regimes in the enlargement countries, but the degree 
to which they were more successful than neighboring countries that did not join the EU is 
questionable. Rather than discrediting his theory, this finding supports it. It shows that 
there are not hard borders around the EU, like there would be if it were closer in 
appearance to a neo-Westphalian empire. Instead, linkages between countries and 
spillover make external borders fuzzy and indistinct, much like a neo-medieval empire. 
In his second example, Zielonka looks at the purpose behind enlargement. States wanted 
to join the EU; they were not coerced into becoming members. They were invited and 
given incentives to change their policies and laws to be compliant with the acquis 
communitaire. The illusion of self-determination during the process contributed to the 
creation of the European empire by providing willing participants. The applicants 
competed with each other to meet the EU’s demands because the EU was negotiating 
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with them as a bloc. The normative power of the EU as a “model of democracy, market 
economy, human rights, and social justice” gave it the upper hand in the negotiations, due 
to the fact that the applicant states looked to it as an example to follow (Zielonka 2006). 
Zielonka (2006) also examines the scope of the EU after enlargement. A common 
criticism of the EU is that it is too diverse to create unity between member states and 
their citizens. Westphalian states typically have a high degree of universalism, while neo-
medieval empires have low universalism and high diversity. Zielonka found that the 
increase in diversity from the enlargement was only marginal, because the EU already 
had a high level of diversity before the enlargement, which would not change the current 
lack of convergence and unity within the EU. He further explains that while diversity can 
make certain types of cooperation difficult within the existing EU institutions, it can also 
facilitate cooperation and further integration (Zielonka 2006). 
 
“Diversity teaches adaptation, bargaining, and accommodation. It is a 
source of competition, self-improvement, and innovation. Thus, it may 
also prove to be not only an important prerequisite of democracy, but also 
of efficiency, in that it may be argued that it is only highly diversified and 
pluralistic societies acting in a complex web of institutional arrangements 




Economic divergence is also found to not be an issue in the functioning of the EU. 
The new member states were too small to matter to make much of an impact on the 
overall GDP of the EU. Furthermore, membership consistently leads to economic growth 
that closes the gap between new and existing member states. The health of a state’s 
economy, or its potential for growth, is a more important factor than its current wealth at 
the time of integration. The divergence in democracy and political culture was also 
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described as a non-issue, because the new member states are similar in profile to the 
original six (Zielonka 2006). 
Economics is currently a divisive topic in the EU. At the time of the publication 
of Zielonka’s book, he was concerned with how the EU would achieve internal cohesion 
and close the welfare gap among member states. He describes the EU policies as 
“decentralized self-help.” This neo-medieval response is characterized by increasing 
liberalization and devolution to stimulate growth by providing scarce assistance with the 
goal of economic efficiency over equality. This is in contrast to a neo-Westphalian 
response, which would have increased central distribution to economically disadvantaged 
countries and groups. In order to remain economically competitive with the rest of the 
world, Zielonka describes a varied response across countries and institutions, a neo-
medieval tactic. A neo-Westphalian tactic would have been a clear, hierarchical 
institutional structure that was highly centralized. To combat instability from surrounding 
countries, the “soft” borders of the EU, the EU has incorporated its neighbors in 
economic agreements, regulations, and laws that is part of a “gradual geographic 
extension of European economic governance.” If the EU were becoming a neo-
Westphalian empire, it would have tried to maintain hard borders and insulate itself from 
the economic troubles of its neighbors (Zielonka 2006). 
To describe how the structure of the EU is evolving into a neo-medieval empire, 
Zielonka (2006) provides this comparison between democratic governance in neo-










Neo-Westphalian Model Neo-Medieval Model 
Structure Coherent system of nested 
governments, stretching up to a 
unified and encompassing European 
level 
Multilevel and multicentered 
governance in concentric circles 
Representation Parliamentary representation is 
dominant, but constrained by 
constitutional provisions 
Non-majoritarian institutions 
dominate over a weak parliament(s) 
Identity An easily identified demos based on 
ethnic and civic ties and operating 
within a rich and compact public 
space 
Multiplicity of distinct demoi 
operating in a segmented public 
space; pan-European identity is 
blurred and weak 
Source: Zielonka 2006, 120. 
 
 
The eastern enlargement reinforced the already multilayered, multicentered, 
heterogeneous EU government. There is no popular support for a single hierarchical EU 
governmental structure. Enlargement does not change the position of the already weak 
European Parliament, because it still conflicts with the interests of national governments 
and grants more power to non-majoritarian institutions within the EU. National identities 
are still dominant, but the ability “...of citizens to contest European decisions will be 
more crucial in a neo-medieval setting than the functioning of institutional channels of 
representation (Zielonka 2006, 139).” 
Zielonka (2006) also classifies the EU as a neo-medieval empire in the way it 
interacts internationally. As an international actor, the EU uses civilian rather than 
military means to influence its periphery, with the belief that its norms are the correct 
ones. The CFSP is a forum for discussion for the member states, but much foreign policy 
is left up to the individual member states, especially when they disagree in security areas. 
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There is no single EU military or police structure; instead, there are many institutions that 
overlap (Zielonka 2006).  
Zielonka (2006) claims that a new international system is emerging within 
Europe. There is a conflict between those who want the core to make decisions and those 
who do not want to be left on the periphery. Zielonka (2006) states that this is a medieval 
conflict that will be dealt with in a medieval fashion, rather than a Westphalian one. 
Members will continue to bargain collectively to solve problems, and will not go to war 
to settle disputes and gain territory (Zielonka 2006). 
Zielonka (2006) summarizes the current European project by saying that it is 
“...largely a civilian power enlarging its territory by consent and diplomatic bargaining 
(170).” The major characteristic that differentiates from empires in history is that it does 
not use violent means to expand. According to Zielonka (2006), the EU already has many 
of the features that it will need to govern its neo-medieval empire: a pluralistic mode of 
government, which is preferable to the Westphalian format, which is a hierarchical 
structure. He recommends that the EU adopt a constitution that is simple, short, and 
comprehensible to replace the current body of legislation (Zielonka 2006). 
In contrast to this view, Keohane and Mattli can also explain the reason for the 
European Union enlargements. In the northern enlargement, the primary driver was 
economic gains. In order to compete globally, the European economies needed to 
combine resources. These potential gains were greater than the reservations some states, 
such as Great Britain, had about joining the European Economic Community. The 
motivation for the southern enlargement was largely based on promoting stability and 
democracy in the candidate states so that they would not fall under Soviet influence. The 
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motivations for the eastern enlargement was similar, but without the strong threat of 
communism. The European Union wanted to ensure democracy and stability at its 
borders. By joining the EU, these countries would have greater interactions with western-
style democracies. This would lead to greater contact between citizens, and the spillover 
of other societal features, such as different types of civil society organizations, as well as 
issue linkages as they integrated further into the EU. All of these reasons for enlargement 
were in the member states’ best interests.  
Regime	  Formation	  Theory	  and	  the	  Formation	  and	  Continuation	  of	  the	  European	  
Union	  
	  
While the European Union may have many characteristics of an empire, empire 
theory does not explain how the EU was formed. For that, regime formation theory is the 
best explanation. The U.S. as a hegemon and non-state actors such as businesses played a 
vital role in the creation of the EU. International cooperation theory can also explain why 
the EU is continuing to grow. 
The	  Role	  of	  Hegemons	  in	  the	  EU	  
	  
Keohane (2005) does not necessarily think that a hegemon is essential for an 
international regime, unlike proponents of the theory of hegemonic stability. According 
to the theory of hegemonic stability, a hegemon is essential. The two central points in the 
theory are that hegemony creates international regimes and that the maintenance of the 
order requires continued hegemony. Hegemony is defined as having a preponderance of 
material resources, in particular: control over raw materials, control over sources of 
capital, control over markets, and competitive advantages in the production of highly 
valued goods. However, Keohane (2005) doubts the validity of the theory of hegemonic 
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stability. An oligarchy, or several actors, usually controls a preponderance of resources, 
not a hegemon. Additionally, maintenance of the order does not require a hegemon due to 
the fact that existing regimes are easier to maintain and states do not want to ruin their 
reputations. As for military power, the hegemon must have enough of it to protect the 
international political economy, but it does not have to dominate militarily worldwide – 
just enough to protect access to major areas of its economic activity (Keohane 2005). 
A regime could be created without a hegemon when, according to Keohane’s 
(2005) version of rational-choice theory, states take their long-term interests into account, 
which often involves collaborating with other states. Therefore, it is beneficial to 
cooperate even on things that are not important to them. In order for this to work, a small 
number of actors must be able to monitor each other’s compliance with rules and 
practices and follow practices making other governments’ welfare dependent on their 
continued compliance with agreements and understandings. In the case of British 
hegemony, imperialist practices allowed countries to trade within their colonial systems, 
instead of having to interact with neighboring countries. Their long-term interests did not 
rely on collaboration with other states (Keohane 2005). 
Keohane (2005) believes that regimes can be formed without a hegemon’s 
influence. However, this does not explain the formation of the European Union. On the 
surface, some of Keohane’s factors seem to be able to explain the European phenomenon. 
There was improved technology, the removal of barriers, and Germany was devastated so 
it was no longer a threat. However, there was no preponderance of resources among the 
European states, because Europe had been devastated by the war, and required U.S. 
assistance to rebuild. None of the European states were in any condition after World War 
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II to have a strong enough military to protect areas of major economic activity, where 
economic activity still existed. The beginning of the European Union is traced to the 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which was established by the Schuman 
Plan of 1950. The preamble for the ECSC Treaty cites ensuring peace as the driving force 
of integration. They sought to create “…an economic community, the foundation of a 
broad and independent community among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts…” 
and to further “the works of peace.” However, the ECSC was not the first plan meant to 
bring peace to Europe. These plans include the Abbé de St. Pierre’s Project of Perpetual 
Peace, Immanuel Kant’s Perpetual Peace, Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalgeri’s 
Paneuropa, and Aristide Briand’s projects in the 1920s and 30s. Therefore, there must be 
other factors driving integration (Mattli 1999). 
Mattli’s theory supplies another compelling factor in the beginning of European 
integration. In his supply-side theory, Mattli (1999) cites an undisputed leader seeking 
integration to be a major factor. The U.S. played a large role in the creation of the ECSC 
and the beginning of the European Union. The U.S. role as a security guarantor, which 
Keohane cites as one of the responsibilities of a hegemon, enabled integration because 
the U.S. presence contained Germany, which satisfied other European countries, France 
in particular, that Germany would not start another war. This gave the Europeans the 
confidence to create a regime that included Germany. The U.S. presence also allowed 
complicated questions about European foreign and defense policy to be decided by the 
Atlantic Alliance, which was under American leadership, decreasing the amount of issues 
that the European countries needed to collaborate on (Mattli 1999). 
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In 1947, the U.S. gave $13 billion in financial aid to Europe through the Marshall 
Plan. In order to receive the money, the states had to form the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation (OEEC). The U.S. required the creation of this organization in order to force 
integration on the European states in order to further its own interests. Due to the fact that 
the U.S. was contributing the funds, it was also represented on the committee, and had 
economic and political leverage (Bache, George, and Bulmer 2011). While this 
committee is a commitment institution that allowed states to monitor compliance, it 
would not have been created without insistence from the U.S. The U.S. also had a vital 
role in negotiations for the ECSC. Originally, German firms were not interested in the 
proposed integration. The U.S. set up a special committee at its embassy in Paris to 
monitor the progress of the ECSC. Eventually, the U.S. High Commissioner in Bonn 
forced an agreement with the German Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer, and the ECSC was 
created (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). 
The U.S. had its own motives for encouraging European integration. The U.S. 
knew that a strong European ally would be a good ally against the Soviet bloc. 
Integration would also produce economic growth, which would increase demand for U.S. 
products and investments. The U.S. also thought that a united and economically 
successful Europe would take a larger share of the U.S.’s current burden, in regard to 
common defense spending, sending aid to developing countries, and solving international 
currency and commodity problems (Mattli 1999). Without the U.S. in its hegemonic role, 
it is possible that European integration would not be as far along as it is today, or even 
have gotten off the ground. 
The	  Role	  of	  Non-­‐State	  Actors	  and	  Commitment	  Institutions	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 Keohane’s framework does include economic gains. However, he frames this part 
of his theory in a broader way than Mattli. In Keohane’s (2005) theory, states look out for 
their own self-interest because the politicians running them are looking out for their own 
best interests. Typically, having a strong economy is in the best interests for the 
politicians, because it increases their popularity, which increases their chances of being 
reelected, and increases the stability of the state, which is all in the state’s self-interest. In 
contrast, Mattli (1999) includes the role of non-state actors in the formation of a regime.   
 Businesses were essential to the formation of the European Union. Article 177 of 
the Treaty of Rome allowed businesses and private individuals to utilize the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) when they thought that government regulations were incompatible 
with European Community rules or the Treaty of Rome. In the 1963 Van Gend & Loos 
case, the ECJ’s decision allowed businesses and private individuals to push their 
governments to live up to their commitments and determined that Community law was 
superior to domestic law. In France, firms lobbied for the French Counseil d’Etat, the 
supreme administrative court, to accept the supremacy of Community law, a goal that 
they ultimately achieved. The French firms pushed for the acceptance of the supremacy 
of Community law because France’s position put them at a competitive disadvantage, 
compared to other firms that were operating in member states that accepted the 
supremacy doctrine. Firms in England also used article 177 in order to get rid of the 
British Shops Act of 1950. Due to this act, all British shops would have to be closed on 
Sundays. However, businesses were able to repeal the act because it violated Article 30 
of the EEC Treaty, meaning that the act was effectively a quantitative restriction on 
imports, because other countries were not required to close their shops on Sundays. 
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Without lobbying and threats by businesses, member states would not have felt as much 
pressure to follow the rules set out by the European treaties and integrate (Mattli 1999). 
 Mattli (1999) calls this method of using the ECJ and the Union’s legal system 
“Euro-litigation.” In a study done by Alec Stone and James Caporaso, they found that the 
pressure by private litigants for supranational rule increases as the number of cross-
national transactions increase. The pressure increases even more in countries that trade 
more with other EU countries. They also found that more litigation leads to more 
Community legislation, suggesting that governments behave reactively, not proactively, 
and are therefore not in control of the integration process. Rather, further integration is a 
response to a sub-national demand for integration, such as a demand from businesses 
(Mattli 1999). 
 The largest example of the role of business interests in the formation of the 
European Union was the Single European Act (SEA) of 1986. This landmark agreement 
established a single common market that included the free movement of capital, labor, 
goods, and services, due to lobbying by businesses (Bache, George, and Bulmer 2011). In 
the 1970s and 1980s, as technology improved, European businesses faced obstacles to 
free trade due to the differing tax regimes in each member country, which raised the cost 
of producing and transporting goods in Europe. This complicated tax system made it 
difficult for European firms to compete with American and Japanese firms. In 1983, to 
remedy this problem, a group of the largest and most influential corporations in Europe, 
such as Volvo, Fiat, and Bosch, formed the Round Table of European Industrialists 
(ERT). The ERT created a list of seven demands for political leaders, including 
harmonizing economic and monetary policies, the development of common standards, the 
	   	  
	  
56	  
freedom of movement of people, information, and ideas, and to redefine EC regional and 
social policies. Lobbying by the ERT for their goals was very effective.  Executives from 
Fiat and Phillips, leading investors in France, met with French President Mitterand to 
discuss their goals for the EC, some of which eventually ended up in Mitterand’s 
European industrial initiative. ERT members also lobbied the Commission, which largely 
supported the ERT’s ideas (Mattli 1999). Combined with bad economic conditions and 
the threat of big businesses to move their capital out of Europe, political leaders came up 
with and signed the SEA. 
 The businesses used the commitment institutions already established in the regime 
extensively to obtain their objective. The European Court of Justice, through the 
supremacy and direct effect principles, helped further European integration. Supremacy, 
the principle that EU law takes precedence over national law, and direct effect, the 
principle that EU law is applicable to citizens without prior intervention by their 
governments, placed constraints on member states and forced them to act within the 
bounds of the EU treaty and laws. The European Commission also aided integration 
because it watched to make sure that citizens, firms, and member states did not violate 
any of the treaties or laws. The Commission is empowered to prohibit firms from making 
agreements that restrict competition, and fine those firms that do. It is also able to make 
demands of member states, to have them stop a certain action, or it can take that member 
state to the European Court of Justice (Mattli 1999). 
 Keohane (2005) does not specifically acknowledge the importance of 
commitment institutions. He cites characteristics that commitment institutions help create 
and reinforce, such as issue linkage, maintenance, and reputation, but he does not delve 
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into institutions created by regimes, whereas Mattli (1999) acknowledges both 
commitment institutions and those same characteristics. This is a large hole in his theory. 
In explaining the beginning of the European Union, the commitment institutions created 
for the ECSC provided a foundation for the institutions in today’s EU. The ECSC 
established a High Authority, a Council of Ministers, a Common Assembly, and a Court 
of Justice. The High Authority is the predecessor to the European Commission, the 
Council of Ministers is the predecessor to the Council of the European Union, the 
European Parliament is similar to the Common Assembly, and the European Court of 
Justice performs a function similar to the Court of Justice (Bache, George, and Bulmer 
2011). Both non-state actors and commitment institutions played an important role in the 
formation of the EU, and should therefore be acknowledged in theories pertaining to 
international cooperation. However, neither of these two potential factors in integration 
schemes are accounted for in empire theory. 
 Author RJ Harrison (1974) gives further evidence of the contribution of external 
actors in his book, Europe in Question. The contribution of an external actor is most 
effective if: 
• Investments conform to the emerging power structure of community; and 
• An indication of the progress of unification and success of external actor is that 
the role of the external actor is taken over (internalized) by a regional actor. 
The three major variables in the relationship between an integrating region and an 
external actor are the international system, the mode of allocation of assets by the 
external actor, and the degree of integration and development of assets already achieved 
within the regional system. In the international system, the relationships of major tension 
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that the external and regional actors are involved in is important. A greater external threat 
results in greater cohesion due to need or convenience, but little or no external threat has 
the opposite effect. The regional actors are suspicious of the external actor(s) and their 
motivations. Cohesion in the face of a threat results in a common ideology, which 
contributes to the emergence and functioning of a regime (Harrison 1974). 
Communication, repetitiveness, and issue linkage, three of Keohane’s transparency and 
interaction factors, would follow a common ideology. In the case of the European Union, 
the common threat was the Soviet Union in the Cold War between the western world and 
the communist one. This threat united Western Europe and prompted the southern 
enlargement. 
The relative weight of assets that the external actor makes available and the 
specificity of the external actor’s purpose also affect the relationship. The greater weight 
of the assets invested results in an increase in the likelihood that the actor’s purpose will 
be achieved. The type of assets – identitive, utilitarian, and coercive – may or may not 
affect the relationship between a burgeoning regime and an external actor. They appear to 
have a situational effect, depending on other factors that affect the relationship, such as 
the international climate. When the external actor is distributing its assets, favoring the 
emerging power structure of the region and not the individual countries has the most 
effect (Harrison 1974). A strong example of an external actor in the formation of the EU 
is the U.S. The U.S., while heavily influencing the outcome of the initial stages of 
integration from backstage, allowed Europe the illusion of making its own decisions, with 
institutions like the OEEC. 
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The final variable, the degree of integration and development of assets within the 
regime, affects the relationship because a lower level of integration and assets in a region 
results in a greater investment by the external actor. As a region becomes more 
developed, it needs less investment, which translates into less influence by an external 
actor (Harrison 1974). Again, this can be seen by the experience of the U.S. in the EU. 
Initially, Europe needed a large investment to get it back on its feet and functioning as a 
collection of stable democracies. As Europe gained in power and prestige, it developed 
its own institutions and policies, such as the CFSP, and became less susceptible to U.S. 
influence. For example, the U.S. was unable to obtain an overwhelming majority of 
support from Europe for the Iraq War. 
How	  regimes	  endure	  
	  
Keohane (2005) cites several reasons for how international regimes endure, even 
if states are rational egoists who are only concerned about themselves. Even when it is 
against their “myopic self-interest,” states comply with international rulings and 
agreements. This is a result of two main reasons. First, existing regimes become easier to 
maintain. States view the creation of the regime as a sunk cost, which would be lost if the 
regime were to be dismantled. Second, regimes create issue linkages. If one regime is 
dismantled, it could negatively affect another. States are also concerned about their 
reputations. If they break a rule, then it could promote other rule violations. Lowering 
their reputation makes it more difficult to enter into advantageous agreements (Keohane 
2005). The European Union fits all of these characteristics: it is easier to maintain than 
dismantle, especially given how tied together the European countries are with the Euro 
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and other common policies. All of the issues, tied together, have created issue linkages, 
and none of the states want to ruin their reputations. 
Other factors that are also considered important in the continuity of European 
integration was the fear of being eclipsed by two world superpowers, the U.S. and the 
Soviet Union, both economically and politically, and the role of a hegemon. The first 
additional factor can be explained through Keohane’s theory. The European countries 
were acting in their own self-interest. By continuing to integrate, they were ensuring that 
they could compete economically. However, Keohane discounts the second additional 
factor, the role of a hegemon. He does not believe that one is needed to maintain the 
regime. Nevertheless, there has been a dominant state present within the European Union 
since the mid-1970s (Mattli 1999). 
Germany is the dominant leader with the EU. While it is impossible to determine 
if it is the main factor in maintaining the EU, it does play a role that Keohane ignores. 
Germany leads the rest of the EU economically. In 2012, it had the ninth largest GDP per 
person. As of September 2013, it had the second lowest unemployment rate overall and 
the lowest youth unemployment rate (Economist.com 2013). In 20ll, Germany was the 
largest importer among the EU-27 of EU goods, and the largest exporter to the EU-27 
(UN COMTRADE Statistics 2011). This economic influence translates to political 
influence, in the form of being a key policy initiator and agenda setter. Germany is 
credited with creation of the European Monetary System and for playing a central role in 
the budget compromise at a summit in 1983. The German Bundesbank is accepted as the 
model for the European Central Bank, and the German “Rhineland model of capitalism” 
has been adopted by the EU. German industry standards are the basis for many European 
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standards. Germany has also been able to leverage its political and economic power to set 
strict convergence criteria for the Maastricht Treaty (Mattli 1999). 
German leadership, however, has been more about consensus than laying down 
rules from above. For example, the European Monetary System was a joint proposal with 
the French (Mattli 1999). More recently, the media had taken to calling German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy “Merkozy” due to their 
continued support and cooperation. Germany is also willing to ease Europe’s 
distributional tensions by being one of the largest contributors to the EU budget. In 2007, 
Germany was the top contributor to the budget, contributing more than the nineteen 
lowest-paying member states combined (BBC 2007). This fits into part of Keohane’s 
theory about empathy in cooperation and self-interest. Germany’s large contributions 
lead to an unbalanced exchange, which creates issue linkage, and a platform for future 
interactions. Policies that improve the economic well-being of the EU improve 
Germany’s economic well-being through increased trade, stability, and security. Support 
for European integration also allowed Germany to build its reputation by showing that it 
was not interested in another World War and was committed to democracy (Mattli 1999). 
Empire theory does not provide an explanation for one state that is dominating the rest, 
but is willing to let the other states be equals in making decisions within the supranational 
institutions. 
	   	  
	  
62	  
Chapter	  3:	  The	  Future	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  
 
The future of the European Union is inevitably tied to what it is. If it is an empire, 
it will fall. This fact has been proven by centuries of history. It will overextend its 
resources and its political and economic institutions will become more extractive. If it is 
more regime-like, it has several options. It could continue as it is, with further 
differentiated integration. It could integrate further and move closer to becoming a 
‘United States of Europe’ or it could fall apart. 
I will begin by identifying a way to understand the European Union. Is it an 
empire, a regime, or does it have characteristics of both? What should it be called? Once I 
have examined it, I will look at its future. Will it survive? What happens if it does not? 
Does it have more than one option? I will also look at some of the issues that the EU 
faces today, and how they may impact its future. 
What	  is	  the	  European	  Union?	  
 As we have seen in the first two chapters, there is no consensus on what the 
European Union is. It does not fit neatly into any of our current fully defined forms of 
government. Having narrowed it down to two competing theories, empire and regime 
formation, I have come to the conclusion that the European Union is more of a regime 
than an empire. To say that the European Union is an empire is misleading. It may appear 
to be one, but in reality, it is not. 
Why	  it	  is	  not	  an	  empire	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 There is a wide variety of literature about the reasons why the European Union is 
an empire. It may have some characteristics of an empire, but it is not one. Empires in 
history began from one strong center that expanded outwards. The Roman Empire began 
with the Roman Republic. The British Empire began with the British; the Spanish Empire 
began with Spain; the Portuguese Empire with Portugal; and so on. The Holy Roman 
Empire is a deviation from this pattern, but several scholars are not even sure that it can 
be called an empire. In the seventeenth century, Samuel Pufendorf called the Holy 
Roman Empire “an irregular or unnatural object…or…a monster (James 2006, 119).” 
Edward Gibbon, author of The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 
describes the Holy Roman Empire as a “body without a head” and “a republic without 
laws or magistrates” where “none are willing to obey [the pope or emperor] (James 2006, 
119.)”One of the main reasons scholars call the European Union an empire is because 
they draw historical parallels between it and the Holy Roman Empire. If we cannot call 
the Holy Roman Empire an empire, how can we call the European Union one? 
 The beginning of the European Union is traced to the European Coal and Steel 
Community. The ECSC established the institutions that would evolve into the institutions 
that govern the EU today. But where is the strong center? The German-French 
relationship could be considered the focal point. However, U.S. influence was a driving 
factor. There was no clear focal point from within the ECSC. Part of the reason the 
European Union has been able to have such a revolutionary level of cooperation was 
because in its early stages, it was made of several states who were relatively strong and 
on equal footing (Zielonka 2006). 
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 The European Union does contain the characteristics identified by Doyle as the 
three essential characteristics that an empire has. Its institutions are strong, and have been 
recently improved by the Treaty of Lisbon. Europeans feel like they are a part of Europe, 
and there is a degree of social differentiation. The EU fits Doyle’s classification as an 
informal empire, because it expanded through means other than force.  
 The history of EU enlargement is perhaps the strongest case for the classification 
of the EU as an empire. Zielonka provided a detailed analysis of why the enlargement of 
the EU made it a type of empire, and not a type of ‘superstate.’ His analysis makes a lot 
of sense. The EU’s soft borders and its diversity make it more empire-like than state-like. 
There are many types of citizenship: local, state, national, and European. Sovereignty is 
divided and, at times, blurred. Institutions and their functions overlap. 
 He then differentiates between types of empires. He describes the EU as a neo-
medieval empire rather than a neo-Westphalian empire because of its method of 
expansion. The EU has expanded through peaceful means by invitation, and uses 
incentives to ensure control through economic or bureaucratic means. This is in contrast 
to empires of the past. A neo-Westpahlian empire would have expanded through 
conquest, and would have used coercion or bribes to ensure control through military or 
political means. The borders of the EU are fuzzy and indistinct, unlike a clear, sharp 
Westpahlian border. One of the larger factors that make the EU resemble a neo-medieval 
empire is that the periphery gradually gains access to the decision-making institutions. 
This is especially true in the case of the European Union, because candidate states that 
become members immediately become active members of the union. Sovereignty is 
shared in different areas. As we have already seen, there is a high amount of diversity. 
	   	  
	  
65	  
 The EU’s method of democratic governance is also supposedly a sign that it is a 
neo-medieval empire. The governmental structure is multilevel and multi-centered. The 
institutions have more power over the parliament. However, Zielonka says that its 
identity is not pan-European. In this case, he is wrong. Eurobarometers show that 
Europeans do feel like they are a part of Europe. A common identity is a characteristic of 
a neo-Westpahlian empire, not a neo-medieval one. 
 The most convincing argument for classifying the European Union as an empire 
comes from Zielonka, with his analysis of the eastern enlargement as a neo-medieval 
empire. However, he does not discuss the other enlargements, and not all of his neo-
medieval characteristics are correct. While some elements of the eastern enlargement 
make the EU seem like an empire, it is not one. There is no clear sovereign leading the 
empire. Instead, all states have a say in the decision-making process. The European 
Union may fit Doyle’s three characteristics of an empire, but so do many other 
organizations. As a country, the U.S. has strong political and economic institutions. Its 
citizens feel that they are a part of the U.S., and there is a large degree of social 
differentiation, as the U.S. has one the highest levels of income inequality of the 
developed world (The Economist 2013a). But does this make the U.S. an empire? No, it 
is a federal state. If the European Union is not an empire, what is it? 
Why	  it	  might	  be	  a	  type	  of	  regime	  
 
 Regime formation theory supplies a convincing argument for what the European 
Union is. It does not say what type of regime the EU has become, but it at least gives it a 
more accurate label. It fully accounts for the formation of the European Union by 
including the role of hegemons and non-state actors and commitment institutions. 
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Keohane lists four factors that are important for the emergence and formation of a 
regime. These four factors easily explain the European Union. The first one, 
interdependence, can be used to explain how European integration has evolved. It began 
with economic integration, which led to interdependence. Together, the integrated 
economies had more power in world trade than apart. This led to spillover into other 
areas traditionally controlled by national governments, as shown by the four major 
integration benchmarks discussed in chapter two.  
 All of the countries were liberal democratic economies when they joined the EU, 
meaning that they were dynamic, based on freedom, private property, and long-term 
contracts. The similarity of their governmental structures, as democracies, means that 
they are less likely to use military means to solve conflicts with one another. This 
concept, the democratic peace, is relatively new, as democracy is a newer form of 
government. It is similar to the idea in the Holy Roman Empire, that states within the 
empire would not fight each other (Muldoon 1999), but it is a much stronger constraint 
than in the Middle Ages. Additionally, this similarity leads to the development of 
transnational networks, because businesses find it less difficult to expand when the same 
or similar rules are shared across economies. This creates a lobby that supports continued 
integration. This causes economic growth and wealth based on industry. 
 Keohane’s third factor, transparency and interaction factors, have also been seen 
in the EU. Certainty, available information, and communication were made possible with 
U.S. influence in the creation of the ECSC. As integration progressed, and more 
sovereignty was given to the commitment institutions, national governments became 
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more confident in each other. This repetitiveness allowed countries to trust one another. 
They became more certain of each other’s intentions. 
 Technology and the removal of barriers, the fourth factor, tie into the previous 
factor. It creates increased contact and trade, much like repetitiveness. This increased 
contact leads to overlapping spheres of influence and economic growth. The overlapping 
spheres lead to greater communication and spread of information. This increases certainty 
and confidence. Economic growth reinforces the idea that integration is positive for the 
member state. 
 In order to explain how regimes endure, even if an action is against that state’s 
self-interest, Keohane provides two explanations. A regime is easier to maintain than 
dismantle and issue linkages are created that are important to the regime. The seventeen 
member states that participate in the Eurozone are a good example. In order to leave the 
European Union, they would also have to leave the Eurozone. They would have to 
rebuild institutions to create and regulate currency, as well as establish their currency on 
the global market. It is easier for them to remain members of the European Union and 
work out whatever issue would ordinarily make them leave if they were not so invested 
in membership. States that are not a part of the Eurozone do not have as much to lose, but 
they can still lose a significant amount. Specifically, they could lose access to the 
common market, and their economy could suffer. This is related to issue linkages. Even if 
one member is unhappy with further political integration, upsetting the other states could 
negatively impact another issue that is important to them, such as the economy. In all of 
these scenarios, continued cooperation is the choice that is in each member state’s long-
term best interests. 
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 The gains from integration are an important factor in determining why states 
integrate. The initial integration, the ECSC, was orchestrated to keep the German from 
using coal and steel in another war against the French and to ensure that the French had 
an adequate supply of coal and steel. Further integration integrated other sectors of the 
economy that created a larger market with lower barriers that increased economic growth. 
Other states wanted to join this integration project in order to achieve the same gains. In 
fact, new member states often achieve a higher initial growth rate than the overall growth 
rate of the community (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). It was in the best interests of 
the member states to allow the new member states to join in order to promote stability on 
the borders of the EU, as well as expand their market. 
 The fulfillment of supply conditions, or the willingness of leaders to create a 
regime, is absolutely necessary. Without the leadership of the founders of European 
integration, who knows what would have happened? There is no possible way to answer 
this question. Things progressed as they did because of the people involved. Keohane 
calls this bounded rationality. Due to the fact that people make the decisions, and not 
states, the unexpected can often happen. People are not always able to rationally analyze 
every bit of information to make the best decision. As a result, historical events can take 
unpredictable turns. This human element can help explain why this European integration 
has worked where others have failed. 
 Consensus is important in order for the continuation of the European Union. 
Without this mechanism, it would fall apart. It helps to explain the ‘stops and starts’ of 
European integration. When consensus fails, there are crises like the ones that occurred in 
1963 and 1965. In 1963, Great Britain applied for membership to the European Economic 
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Community. French President Charles de Gaulle did not want the British to join, but was 
not in a position to veto their application for membership. In order to stop the 
enlargement, the French delegation sabotaged the negotiations by demanding concessions 
that they knew the British would not agree to. Eventually, de Gaulle was able to find a 
reason to veto the application when the British reached a deal on nuclear weapons with 
the U.S. The other member states were upset with de Gaulle for undermining the system 
of cooperation that they had created. Similarly, in 1965, the French again slowed 
European integration when they boycotted all Council of Minister meetings for six 
months to protest a proposal about the financing of the Community budget. This event, 
called the ‘empty chair crisis,’ caused a lowering of morale in the Commission, as well as 
undermining the authority of two of the Commissioners (Bache, George and Bulmer 
2011). Luckily, factors mentioned above, such as issue linkage, helped to ensure that 
cooperation resumed.  
 European integration is difficult to classify because it so unique. Its history is 
unlike that of any other integration project. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) say that 
critical junctures have a profound impact on the direction that events take. They use the 
development of Eastern and Western Europe as an example. Initially, in the Middle Ages, 
both regions were relatively similar. The differences were minor, so there was no reason 
for them to develop so differently, until something happened. The Black Death was the 
critical juncture that changed the path of development. When the Black Death wiped out 
most of Europe’s population, it allowed for different paths to recovery. Small institutional 
differences, such as the rights of workers, drastically altered the recovery. In Western 
Europe, workers had more rights, so institutions became more democratic. In Eastern 
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Europe, where workers had less rights and villages were more spread out, feudal society 
was intensified. This forever altered the future of the two regions (Acemoglu and 
Robinson 2012). 
 Critical junctures in the history of the European Union were important to its 
development. World War II was the first major event. It intensified the need to find a way 
for the European nations to cooperate to eliminate violence. The war totally devastated 
Europe, allowing them a chance to rebuild from scratch. Other events also preclude major 
integration projects. The Suez crisis6, along with other world events, reminded Europeans 
that unless they stood together, they would easily be overpowered (Bache, George and 
Bulmer 2011). The fall of the Soviet Union was another major event. It opened up the 
possibility that integration could go even further with further enlargements. Additionally, 
it created the necessity for enlargement in order to ensure democracy and stability 
throughout the region. 
Classification	  
I would classify the European Union as a hybrid. It is a type of regime that has 
characteristics of an empire. To say that it is only an empire, even a neo-medieval one, is 
misleading. Empire theory does not account for the role of other states and the level of 
cooperation between the member states. The metropole-periphery relationship is 
ambiguous; once a state becomes a member, they become a part of the metropole’s 
decision-making institutions. They can only be classified as the periphery in a 
geographical sense. Economic integration up until the 1992 Program of the Single 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  The	  French	  used	  the	  nationalization	  of	  the	  Suez	  Canal	  by	  the	  Egyptian	  President,	  Gamal	  Abdel	  
Nasser,	  as	  an	  excuse	  to	  overthrow	  his	  regime	  for	  supporting	  the	  Algerian	  rebels.	  However,	  the	  French	  
were	  humiliated	  when	  the	  British	  government	  withdrew	  their	  support	  in	  the	  face	  of	  opposition	  from	  
the	  U.S.	  France	  was	  unable	  to	  complete	  the	  operation	  by	  itself	  (Bache,	  George	  and	  Bulmer	  2011).	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European Act most resembles regime formation. As much state autonomy was 
maintained as possible, and there was no real central authority. However, political 
integration does contain imperial characteristics. In the enlargements, the candidate states 
had to adopt all Community laws in order to join (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). The 
structure of the political integration is much more central, as it was institutionalized in 
different pillars.  
The classification of the European Union as a hybrid cooperative regime with 
characteristics of an empire is able to explain more of the events in its history. The 
critical junctures that the EU experienced make it unique from any other project ever 
attempted. Due to this fact, we cannot fit the EU into any of our existing frameworks. 
Instead, we must put it in a new one that has room for flexibility, because the future of 
the EU is still unknown. There are several paths that it could take. 
The	  Road	  to	  the	  Future	  
	  
 There are two possible scenarios for the future of the European Union. One spells 
disaster for the European integration project after a move towards a more empire-like 
structure. The other is optimistic and predicts increased cooperation and interdependence, 
albeit in two different ways. However, the EU must be able to overcome three obstacles: 
member state reluctance, immigration and further integration, and the economic crisis. 
The internal forces of evolution push it towards growth, but the ultimate outcome 
depends on external factors.  
Scenario	  One:	  Decline	  
	  
 While the comparison between the Holy Roman Empire and the European Union 
is not currently accurate, it could become more relevant. The characteristics of an empire 
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that are present in the EU could become more prominent and move the EU towards 
empire. Becoming an empire would be the end of European integration, because all 
empires fall. This is most likely in the advent of a hostile international environment that 
does not respect supranational institutions. If there are no multilateral regimes or 
superpowers the world is fragmented into poles of competition. Nation-states would put 
themselves before any integration projects. This would lead to international anarchy and 
security concerns, which became more prominent after the September 2011 terrorist 
attacks. The EU needs to protect itself from international terrorism, the possible use of 
weapons of mass destruction, and instability caused by failed states (James 2006). In 
order to alleviate the security concerns, the European Union move towards an empire to 
protect its borders and its interests. 
However, the European Union does not need to become an empire to go into 
decline. Its current demographic problem could be result in its decline. The declining 
birth rate in Europe is unsustainable. There are not enough workers to support the retired 
population or the economy. The solution to this is migrant workers. However, the 
introduction of migrant workers who are primarily of Muslim, North African, or Arab 
origin drastically changes the make-up of society. This demographic change could be too 
much for the EU to handle, and it could fall apart. 
Scenario	  Two:	  Growth	  
	  
 In the second scenario, the international environment remains open to 
cooperation. International cooperation is organized around institutions created by the 
U.S., which played the role of the hegemon in hegemonic stability theory. There is a 
convergence between globalization and European integration. Increased economic 
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cooperation leads to increased interdependence. This increased interaction creates 
harmful effects, so institutions must be built to manage the effects.  
Growth is most likely to occur one of two ways, depending on which vision 
becomes accepted by most member states. In the first vision, the one favored by the 
British, the European Union is based on decentralization and respect for sovereign states. 
British Prime Minister David Cameron’s speech on the European Union illustrated this 
view. In it, he says that the main purpose of the EU is now securing prosperity rather then 
peace. The completion of the single market should be the EU’s driving mission, as it is 
the foundation of the EU. The EU should be able to respond to issues and crisis as a 
network, rather than a bloc, by allowing flexibility in integration. The states that want to 
integrate more should be able to, but the ones that prefer to retain more sovereignty, like 
Great Britain, should be able to opt out. This statement in Cameron’s speech captures the 
British view of the European Union: 
“I know that the United Kingdom is sometimes seen as an argumentative 
and rather strong-minded member of the family of European nations. And 
it's true that our geography has shaped our psychology. We have the 
character of an island nation: independent, forthright, passionate in 
defence of our sovereignty. We can no more change this British sensibility 
than we can drain the English Channel. And because of this sensibility, we 
come to the European Union with a frame of mind that is more practical 
than emotional. For us, the European Union is a means to an end – 
prosperity, stability, the anchor of freedom and democracy both within 
Europe and beyond her shores – not an end in itself [emphasis added] 
(Cameron 2013).” 
 
In the second vision, which is widely considered to be the French approach, there 
is a constant transfer of powers to Brussels and widespread supraregional institutions. In 
a speech, French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius describes how deeper economic 
integration within the Eurozone will create an economic government to improve its 
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management. He also explains France’s vision for the future of the EU: innovation, 
sustainable growth, and global peace and security. He identifies it as a “new ambition” 
for the European Union. There is discussion of improving economic ties and signing new 
trade agreements, but then he moves on to new common policies that will require major 
investments to bolster up-and-coming economic sectors. He wants the EU to play a larger 
role in the world by having the member states act together politically. Fabius concludes 
his speech by saying: 
“…on the European side, many of us are committed to finding solutions 
that could build sustainable growth and ensure Europe’s place on the 
world stage. As François Mitterrand, a former French President deeply 
committed to European integration, used to say: “France is our fatherland, 
Europe is our future”. We are dedicated to meeting this challenge (Fabius 
2013).” 
 
Obstacles	  to	  Growth	  
The survival of the European Union is not a definite conclusion. Several major 
obstacles stand in the way of further successful European integration. Some member 
states are experiencing waves of anti-European sentiment that could result in them 
leaving the union. Great Britain is one example, although slightly out of the ordinary due 
to its unique history. The issue of further enlargements has the potential to affect the 
future of the EU. How many more members should the EU accept? How will the EU deal 
with its declining population without more members? Of course, one of the biggest and 
most well known issues is the economic crisis in the Eurozone. Why do these obstacles 
matter for the future of the European Union? 
Great	  Britain	  
	  
 Great Britain has been reluctant to integrate further with the other European 
countries from the very beginning of the European project. Part of the reason such a weak 
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organization emerged from the 1948 Hague Conference was because Great Britain did 
not want to be a part of it. There was no dominant leader willing to take responsibility 
and push the other states to accept a stronger agreement. Great Britain had this potential, 
but it chose not to use it (Bache, George and Bulmer 2011). 
 British reluctance was seen again with the Schuman Plan and the Treaty of Paris. 
Britain was reluctant to join the ECSC, even though it had the option to do so, largely 
because its history is very different from all of the other European states. British 
nationalism was never discredited, like it was in Germany. There is no sense of 
discontinuity with the past because the history of the British government stretches back 
much further than that of the republics created after World War II. Great Britain was also 
stronger economically, so it did not have a pressing need for cooperation. Keohane’s 
theory of bounded rationality can also explain British reluctance. Not all of the leaders 
were willing to integrate with Great Britain. Ernest Bevin felt personally insulted, and 
Monet knew that Great Britain would not participate. He did not want the British to 
participate because he held them responsible for the weak Council of Europe (Bache, 
George and Bulmer 2011). 
 Great Britain was also reluctant to join the Eurozone, preferring to keep its 
historic currency. To add to the Euroskepticism, British citizens are supposed to vote on 
whether Britain should remain a member of the EU in 2017. More immediately, it is 
likely that British voters will elect European Parliament representatives in May 2014 
from the UK Independence Party, a political party that is anti-EU.  The author of the 
article in The Economist (2013c) sees two outcomes: a ‘Little England’ that is smaller, 
less important, and isolated or a ‘Great Britain’ that is more efficient, confident, and 
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embraces openness. Currently, England’s economy is strong, and they excel at integrating 
immigrants into society, even if society is anti-immigrant. However, if Scottish voters 
vote to leave the United Kingdom, England will lose a lot of its world influence because 
it will be reduced in size by one-third. Additionally, anti-immigrant policies are hurting 
Britain’s economy by discouraging skilled workers and reducing exports. The leadership 
in Britain is not consistent with their policy opinions on the EU. Leaders go from wanting 
to reform the EU to threatening to leave it (The Economist 2013c). 
 This anti-immigrant sentiment is not unique to Britain. As we will see below, 
particularly with Turkey, the immigration question is something that will need to be 
addressed by all member states in order to solve the problem of Europe’s declining birth 
rate. If Great Britain were to leave the EU, it could set a precedent that it is easier to leave 
than work together. Anti-EU groups in other member states will gain traction as citizens 
wonder if it is better to be outside of the EU. It could be the beginning of disintegration. 
The	  Turkish	  Question	  and	  Immigration	  
 
Enlargement, as a characteristic of an empire, has the potential to lead the European 
Union towards decay. Overextension is the downfall of many empires. When should the 
EU stop accepting new member states? One state’s potential membership in the EU is 
very controversial due to its predominantly Muslim religion and lower socioeconomic 
standards. It shows the xenophobia present in European society, but also addresses a very 
real concern: if ethnic or linguistic differentiation grows too large, the European Union 
could disintegrate.  
In reality, Turkey has been interacting with the European integration project since the 
beginning. This westernization goes back to 1947, when Turkey received funds from the 
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Marshall Plan. Since then, Turkey has pursued a closer relationship with Europe. It has 
had an Association Agreement with the European Union envisaging membership since 
1963, but has yet to become a member. Advocates of Turkish EU membership argue that 
it will add diversity to a largely white, Christian Europe, and that Turkey would be a 
valuable resource in Middle East relations, in addition to tightening relations within 
NATO (Bache, George, and Bulmer 2011).   
Public opinion in EU member countries is a major barrier to Turkish accession to 
the EU. Many citizens believe that Turkish culture is too different from European culture.  
In a public opinion survey, up to 75% of Germans oppose membership, while only 20% 
of the French public approve of Turkish membership. Austria has the highest disapproval 
rating: 75% of 15-24 year-olds and 82% for people over 55 do not want Turkey to 
become a member. In Italy, support for Turkey is below 40% and only 25% of Greeks 
support Turkey’s bid. In Spain, 33% of people oppose membership, but 42% plus the 
government are in favor of membership. The Netherlands and Hungary are strongly 
divided, while Turkey has 54% of public support in Poland and support from Britain. 
Denmark and Sweden are strongly against Turkish membership (Repa 2005).   
Opposition to Turkish membership from the EU public often stems from fears of 
immigration. Voters in France rejected the Constitutional Treaty in part due to the state of 
the French economy, which was experiencing an influx of cheap labor from the new 
eastern members of the EU during a time of rising unemployment. This led to concern 
over an influx of immigrants from Turkey if it was to join the EU (Bache, George, and 
Bulmer 2011). In Austria, xenophobia is the cause of opposition to Turkish accession 
(Traynor 2010). The public is worried that the relatively poor Turkish citizens will 
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migrate to other member states after accession in search of better economic opportunities, 
which could lead to negative socioeconomic consequences (Grigoriadis 2006). A concern 
that many people have is that the Turkish Muslim identity will cause the Turkish 
immigrants to put their religious practices before the law. They think that the immigrants 
will remain ‘ghettoized’ and not integrate into society (Üçer 2006). Other opponents to 
Turkish membership believe that Europe’s Christian heritage is the only common 
denominator that unites the European Union. They argue that Turkey is not suitable for 
EU membership because it lacks this common denominator (Grigoriadis 2006). 
Member state preferences have played a large role in Turkey’s effort to join the 
EU. Germany and France are largely responsible for the slow progress on Turkish 
accession. They both favor a ‘privileged partnership’, as opposed to full membership. 
Conservatives in both countries are worried about the cultural differences between 
Christian Europe and Muslim Turkey (Bache, George, and Bulmer 2011). In Germany, 
specifically, support for Turkish EU membership changes depending on who is in power. 
The CDU government (pre-September 2013 elections) does not favor Turkish accession 
(Bache, George, and Bulmer 2011). Turkish-French relations were strained when France 
passed a law that does not allow anyone to deny the Armenian holocaust. This law 
angered the Turks, who threatened to put economic sanctions in place against France 
(Staff and Vandoorne 2012).   
Many people in the EU doubt that Turkey can be considered a European state. 
They do not think that Turkey’s Muslim population will be able to integrate with 
Europe’s largely Christian population because Turkish citizens speak fewer European 
languages than citizens in other states, have poor English speaking skills, and are more 
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likely to support illiberal precepts in politics. The negative public opinion of Turkey is a 
severe disadvantage for the country because several member states have said that they 
would hold referenda on the question of Turkish accession (Scherpereel 2010). In this 
case, member state preferences do not play a significant direct role in Turkish accession.  
However, its indirect role is significant. Politicians in the countries who want to hold 
referenda are doing so in order to keep their constituents’ support. In a further example of 
public opinion dictating state preferences, President Chirac and the new French 
government tried to appease voters by showing waning support for Turkish accession 
when French voters rejected the EU Constitutional Treaty (Grigoriadis 2006). 
In order to prevent overextension and the growth of too much ethnic and linguistic 
differentiation, the European Union needs to set a clear limit on expansion. If it does not, 
its structure will evolve to become more empire-like in order to handle the large amount 
of diversity and differing demands from member states. The conflict between scale and 
intensity would be such that the scale is much too large for the level of intensity that is 
needed to effectively govern and ensure cooperation. 
The example of Turkey reveals another issue that the EU needs to address in order 
to prevent decline: anti-immigration sentiment and policy. While this is a large issue that 
deserves a paper of its own, I will address it briefly. Without a work force to support the 
economy and the aging population, exports will decline and the economy will decline or 
stagnate. The EU needs to develop a way for labor to be imported. One way this can be 
achieved is by allowing the few remaining European non-member states, such as Turkey, 
to join the EU. While their populations may be poorer, the member states cannot afford to 
not allow them to live and work in their countries. 





 The economic crisis in 2008 affected everyone. In Europe, the countries most in 
trouble are known as the PIIGS: Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain. Ireland was 
also especially hard hit. When the Eurozone was created, suddenly member governments 
using the Euro were able to borrow money at a much lower interest rate than they had 
previously. Due to this, they began to borrow money at a much higher rate. Greece, in 
particular, was guilty of this. The other countries also had a large amount of private debt, 
which is discussed below. In Greece, the government was lying about how much money 
it was borrowing. When investors found out, the Greek economy began to collapse as 
they pulled their money out. The other countries were more affected by the real estate 
bubble in 2008. When the bubble burst, unemployment increased and tax revenue, 
already low, was even lower. Bank solvency was in question (Krugman 2011). 
 Today, Ireland is seen as an example of a successful recovery. By following strict 
austerity measures, Ireland is on track to exit the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
bailout program by the end of this year. Jobs in the construction industry, which was 
especially hard-hit by the real estate bubble, are slowly coming back as property values 
rise and unemployment slowly falls. However, unemployment is still at thirteen percent 
(Illmer 2013). Paul Krugman (2013) does not believe that Ireland is a success story. He 
points to the high unemployment and low growth rate as a sign that Ireland still has a 
long way to go to fully recover. 
 Ireland’s austerity measures appear to be a model for other struggling Eurozone 
countries and a validation of the austerity measures of Europe’s leaders. However, 
Ireland’s economy is ten percent smaller than it was before the crisis and the country is 
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experiencing mass emigration and unemployment. The hard times are by no means over. 
Additionally, the Irish model of success will not necessarily work in other Eurozone 
countries. Irish society has a large degree of social cohesion; therefore, all political 
groups agreed that austerity measures were necessary. Other countries, such as Greece, 
experienced unrest due to differing views among political parties about what should be 
done to save the economy (Illmer 2013). 
 It is not only sovereign borrowing that is negatively affecting the economies of 
member states. ‘Zombie firms’ and overindebted households, according to The Economist 
(2013b), have caused the economic crisis to evolve into a chronic crisis. In October 2013, 
the European Central Bank (ECB) announced that it would start an inspection of the 
balance sheets of Europe’s biggest banks in order to determine which banks are still 
above water, which will need more capital, and which will need to be shut down. The 
ECB is doing this because of bad loans made to households and companies. Mortgage 
debt in Ireland and Spain and corporate borrowing in Portugal and Spain led to the 
economic crisis in these countries. Other member states, including Germany, have been 
reluctant to look into banks on their own, so it falls to the ECB to clean up the banks (The 
Economist 2013b). 
 The countries in the Eurozone need to reduce private-debt burden if they hope to 
avoid further economic crisis. This has happened much more slowly than in the U.S., for 
three reasons: fiscal austerity imposed on peripheral economies deepened the recession; 
weak banks have not wanted to recognize and make provisions for bad loans; and 
European bankruptcy law is not conducive to restructuring debt because it is not debtor-
friendly. The corporate debt problem, which is worse in Portugal, Spain, and Italy, 
	   	  
	  
82	  
creates ‘zombie companies.’ These companies are unable to pay their interest payments 
from their pre-tax earnings. Therefore, they are unable to invest or grow, so they are 
stagnant. Private loan debt is highest in Ireland and the Netherlands. Consumers who are 
attempting to pay back large amounts of debt lowers consumer spending, which 
negatively affects the economy (The Economist 2013b). 
 In order to combat debt and strengthen the Euro, members of the Eurozone need 
to lessen austerity measures and be tougher on their banks. Lessening austerity measures 
will allow private debt to shrink. Being tougher on the banks and trying to change the 
culture to be friendlier to debtors by allowing them to restructure their loans will go a 
long way towards lowering private debt, which is slowing European growth more than 
government debt (The Economist 2013b). Solving the government debt crisis is another 
matter entirely. Economists such as Paul Krugman have identified various paths that the 
EU can take, such as harsh austerity measures, debt restructuring, default, or the creation 
of a transfer union (Krugman 2011). The last option of a transfer union would integrate 
Europe even further and move it closer to a federal system like the U.S.  
Unless this crisis is resolved, it could result in disintegration as member states 
decide that they are better off using their own currency. There are two possible ways of 
responding to the crisis: either by containing the public sector or instituting redistributive 
policies to combat the negative economic effects. The second option would curtail 
individual liberties, innovation and productivity, leading to extractive institutions 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). These extractive institutions would lead to the fall of the 
European Union. The first option is the more desirable one. By reigning in the debt crisis, 
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economic growth will return and the European Union will regain its attractiveness to 
other nations7. 
Muddling	  Through:	  Moving	  between	  deterioration	  and	  survival	  
	  
 In an ideal world, we would know what path the European Union should take to 
survive and perhaps integrate further. However, this is not the case. There are many 
directions that the EU could go, depending on member state preferences and world 
events, such as critical junctures. We have no way of knowing if a major event will 
change the course of history. Politics also contribute to the murky future. States are led 
by human leaders who make human decisions that are often not logical, as is described in 
Keohane’s bounded rationality theory. Ideally, the European Union will continue to grow 
and prosper as a hybrid regime that improves the economics and politics of its members. 
We cannot predict the future, but we can recommend that the European Union avoid 
adopting more characteristics of an empire. Rather, it should retain the characteristics of a 
regime. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  Other	  factors	  also	  contribute	  to	  the	  European	  Union’s	  attractiveness,	  such	  as	  specific	  redistributive	  
programs	  and	  economic	  assistance.	  However,	  I	  will	  not	  go	  into	  detail	  on	  these	  factors	  in	  order	  to	  
simplify	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  






 This approach to understanding and examining the European Union is significant 
because it provides a more complete picture of the dynamics behind the forces of 
integration and what could affect the EU in the future. The hybrid regime classification is 
necessary because there are no complete theories to explain what the EU is. It is a 
constantly evolving monster that can make up the rules – and change them – as it moves 
forward. Its history of integration shows how it moved from economic integration to 
cover more sectors, and eventually began to incorporate political integration. 
It remains a fascinating case of an integration project because of its attractiveness 
to candidate countries and how it helps improve their economic well-being. In Ukraine, 
massive demonstrations illustrate this point. Despite the current economic crisis, the EU 
model is still attractive. In a choice between Europeanization and closer ties with Russia, 
Ukrainian citizens have demanded Europeanization (Kravets 2013). The EU’s hybrid 
capabilities would allow it to provide both economic and political stability to Ukraine. 
These two capabilities increase its attractiveness to other states. In a World Bank report, 
the EU is described as the only regional integration arrangement that allows the living 
standards of the lower developed countries to catch up to the highly developed ones. It is 
called a ‘convergence machine (Gill).’  
Its current set up as a hybrid regime gives the EU two paths for the future. In one, 
the outcome is bleak. The EU, the shining example of regional integration, is no more. It 
is an empire only looking out for itself. In the second path, the EU survives. However, 
there are two ways that it could survive, depending on the influence of Great Britain and 
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France. All of these scenarios are extremely vulnerable to critical junctures, or external 
events, as well as internal factors that must be dealt with. The future of the EU depends 
on it remaining a regime, and not becoming an empire.
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